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A SUMMARY 

THE CASE OF 



Seneral Fitz-Johk Porter, 



BY 



Theodore a. Lord. 



SECOND EDITION. 



SAN FRANCISCO : 
1883. 






V 



Copyright, 1883, 
By THEODORE A. LORD. 



CONTENTS. 



Page. 

Historical Sketch of Pope's Campaign 5 

The Charges and Comments Thereon 14 

The Night-march from Warrenton Junction to 

Bristoe Station 18 

Events of the 29TH of August 31 

The "Joint Order" 35 

The Time of Longstreet's Arrival 52 

The " 4.30 p. m. Order " 59 

The Animus 64 

Errors of the Court-martial 70 

Lincoln's Approval 79 

Porter's Conduct August 30TH 80 

maps- 
General Map of the Scene of 

Pope's Campaign Facing page 5 

Operations of August 29TH Facing page 33 




This map is copied, in a reduced form, from a map contained in that admirable 
work, the " History of the Civil War in America," by the Comte de Pans. I am 
indebted to Messrs. Porter & Coates, of Philadelphia, the publishers of that work, for 
their kind permission to use the map. The permission was specially given exclusively 
for this purpose. Owing to the process employed for reprintmg, this map does not do 
justice to the beautiful execution of the original. 



A SUMMARY 



OF THE CASE OF 



Q^muii yiTZ-jom porter, 



The recall of McClellan's army from the Peninsula 
enabled Lee to leave Richmond, and direct his whole 
force against General Pope. The latter, with about 
42,000 men, was occupying a very advanced position, 
the main part of his force being in the vicinity of Cedar 
Mountain, while detachments guarded the fords of the 
Rapidan. He was confronted by Jackson with about 
22,500 men. That enterprising commander had re- 
cently beaten Banks, in the Battle of Cedar Mountain, 
and was eager to obtain reenforcements so that he might 
resume the offensive. 

Before the retrograde movement of the Army of the 
Potomac actually began, Lee dispatched troops to the 
support of Jackson, and prepared to surprise Pope in 
his dangerous position. Pope learned of this inten- 
tion, prudently retired behind the Rappahannock, and 
held the line of that river from Kelly's Ford to the 
neighborhood of Freeman's Ford. On the 21st of 
August, 1862, Lee, with a total force of about 55,000 
men, now fully released by the actual withdrawal of the 
Army of the Potomac, held the opposite side of the 
Rappahannock. 

Being unable to surprise Pope, Lee determined to 
turn his right flank. On the 2 2d, Jackson, with his 



three divisions and Stuart's cavalry, marched up the 
right bank of the river, and sent a small part of his force 
across at Sulphur Springs. 7'hat evening, in the midst 
of a furious rain-storm, Stuart pushed on to Catlett's 
Station, fired into a train of cars, captured all of Pope's 
staff papers, attempted, without success, to destroy the 
railroad bridge, and finally effected a safe retreat. The 
rapid rise of the river in consequence of the rain, 
checked Jackson's further progress, and also prevented 
the return of the force which had already crossed. 
Pope had, from the first, divined the purpose of Jack- 
son s movement, and prepared to meet it ; but, unfor- 
tunately, he was so inconstant in his plans, that he 
adopted a course of action which led only to a useless 
result. His first intention was to let Jackson cross 
with all his force, and then attack him while separated 
from Longstreet. For this purpose the troops were 
rapidly marched in the required direction. Next, he 
decided to cross the river and attack Longstreet while 
separated from Jackson. Then the troops were as 
rapidly marched in the opposite direction. They had 
hardly reached the positions last designated, when they 
were all ordered back again in the first direction, with 
the hope of intercepting the small force of the enemy 
which was isolated by the flood. Thus for three days 
the Federal soldiers were harassed and wearied by 
hurried and continuous marches and countermarches, 
only to find that Jackson had quietly withdrawn the 
brigade which had been endangered, and was preparing 
to make a far more serious demonstration. 

On the 25th his whole force crossed the river at 
Hinson's Mill, and reached Orleans. Protected from 
attack by the Bull Run Mountains, he pursued his way 



with all possible speed towards Thoroughfare Gap. 
Early in the morning of the 26th he passed through 
the Gap without opposition. That evening he cut the 
telegraph and tore up the railroad track at Bristoe 
Station. Still untiring, he pushed on that night for 
Manassas Junction. Before morning his advanced 
guard captured the place after a slight skirmish, and 
plundered and burned the vast quantity of stores col- 
lected there. He was now fully in the rear of the 
Federal army. He had stopped all of I^ope's supplies, 
and had interrupted all communication with Washing- 
ton. His movements had completely mystified Pope. 
About noon of the 25th the latter was informed 
that Jackson was moving northward in force, but he 
could not divine the purpose or destination of the 
march. He believed that the enemy were going to 
the Shenandoah Valley, and took no precautions to 
withdraw his army or protect his communications and 
supplies. On the same day Lee moved Longstreet's 
corps up the river, into the positions vacated by Jack- 
son. By a vigorous cannonade and by threatening 
movements of troops, continued through the 25th 
and 26th, he diverted attention from Jackson's march, 
and kept the F"ederal army in constant apprehension 
and activity. Late in the afternoon of the 26th, 
Longstreet crossed the river and followed the route 
taken by Jackson. It was evident that the two were 
acting in concert, but Pope was helplessly, almost 
despairingly, groping to find out what they intended 
to do. He seems to have thought of every direction 
but the one they took, and to have planned for him- 
self every course but the right one. The result was 
a series of erroneous, contradictory and futile orders — 



tedious and useless to follow in detail — which imposed 
upon the already exhausted and ill-fed troops, long and 
rapid marches by day and night in wrong directions, 
whence they were speedily recalled to go in other 
wrong directions. These harassing and ill-planned 
movements wore out the strength, spirits and confi 
dence of officers and men, and left Pope as badly off 
at the end of them as he was at the beginning. 

By the 26th of August, Pope had been reenforced 
by 23,000 men of the Army of the Potomac, 
(including the corps of General Fitz-John Porter), 
and he had previously received 8,000 men by the 
arrival of Reno's corps. His army considerably out- 
numbered Lee's, and he had the expectation of a large 
increase of force as soon as he should place himself 
where additional troops could reach him. The raid 
upon the railroad and telegraph at Bristoe Station par- 
tially disclosed the secret of Jackson's movement. 
On the morning of the 27th, Pope promptly and 
properly ordered his army to concentrate upon 
Gainesville. This step should have been taken sooner, 
but as it was, he had full opportunity to reap its ad- 
vantages. The position of Gainesville commands the 
road leading through Thoroughfare Gap. That road 
would probably be taken by Jackson in case he should 
retreat, and certainly by Longstreet, in the endeavor 
to reach Jackson. Holding Gainesville in force, and 
strongly guarding the Gap, Pope would intervene 
between the two wings of the rebel army. No com- 
mander could have wished to be better situated. Hav- 
ing intercepted Jackson's most available line of retreat. 
Pope designed to pursue and defeat him, before he 
could be joined by Longstreet. The commands of 



9 



McDowell, Sigel and Reynolds reached Gainesville 
on the night of the 27th, and the rest of the 
army was within supporting distance. Hooker had a 
successful engagement that evening, at Bristoe Station, 
with Jackson's rear guard under Ewell, and the latter 
had retired in the direction of Manassas. Pope was 
exactly in the position in which he should have been, 
and wished to be ; but in his zeal to pursue and, as he 
expressed it, " bag" Jackson prematurely, he threw 
away all the chances of i^(t,gging him at all. The 
troops, after toilsome marching, had no sooner reached 
the designated positions, in which they ought to have 
remained, than they were ordered to withdraw, at 
daylight of the 28th, and start for Manassas. Pope 
even defeated the efforts which his subordinates made 
to do something right in spite of him. McDowell had 
given orders for the disposition of the force under his 
command, (which included his own and Sigel's corps, 
and the division of Reynolds, altogether about 30,000 
men), so that he could hold Thoroughfare Gap and the 
road leading from Hopewell Gap. When the order 
came from Pope to abandon that vitally important 
position, and march to Manassas, McDowell, though 
directed to take his whole force, assumed the respon- 
sibility of detaching Ricketts' division to guard Thor- 
oughfare Gap, and delay the advance of Longstreet. 
This was as judicious and meritorious an act as was 
done during that campaign, but Pope blamed McDowell 
for having done it. 

The order to march to Manassas was based upon 
the supposition that Jackson was there; but before the 
movement commenced he had abandoned that place, 
and had taken a strong position north of the Warren - 
ton Turnpike. His front was protected by the cuts 



10 



and embankment of an unfinished railroad, and he 
held the woods and heights in rear of it. His left 
rested upon Bull Run, near Sudley Springs, and his 
right was near the Turnpike, between Gainesville and 
Groveton. More than 20,000 men defended a line 
only a mile and three quarters long. A. P. Hill was 
sent to Centerville, to draw Pope in that direction. 
This he succeeded in doing, and soon rejoined Jackson 
in the position described. The complete execution of 
Pope's order, therefore, would leave the way open to 
Thoroughfare Gap, so that Jackson could retreat, or 
Longstreet advance, at pleasure. But, as the Federal 
army was soon to learn, Jackson did not wish to 
retreat any farther than was necessary to secure a safe 
position, in which he could await Longstreet's arrival. 
Pope's dispositions favored the design most admirably 
and unexpectedly. The movement to Manassas was 
bad enough, but as if to enlarge the error, Pope, misled 
by Jackson's ruse, ordered nearly the whole army to 
Centerville. This was exactly opposite to the direction 
which it should have taken. The chance of retrieving 
so many false steps was well-nigh hopeless. 

In the afternoon of the 28th, King's division of 
McDowell's corps, while making the retrograde march 
on the road to Centerville, unexpectedly stumbled 
upon Jackson, between Gainesville and Groveton. 
Then ensued the terrific combat of Gainesville, which 
lasted from five o'clock until nine at night, and 
ended as a drawn battle. That accidental engage- 
ment which showed, simply Jackson's zest for fight- 
ing and his ferocity in attack. Pope interpreted as a 
desperate attempt of the enemy to break through 
the forces which were supposed to be barring his 
retreat. That night, therefore, he issued orders for 



11 



the pursuit and capture of Jackson. But the plan was 
based upon a serious error. Jackson had no thought 
of retreating, but King who was supposed to be hold- 
ine him in check, and Ricketts who was expected to 
detain Longstreet, did retreat. They, not knowing 
exactly what to do, though meaning well, actually did 
the worst thing possible under the circumstances. 
The one retired to Manassas, and the other to Bristoe. 
The road from Jackson's position to Thoroughfare 
Gap was thus left wholly unobstructed. As soon as 
Pope learned of the retreat of King, he sought to 
remedy the evil by ordering the reoccupation of 
Gainesville which he had so carelessly abandoned. 
But he was then too late ; men could not march as 
easily or rapidly as orders could be issued ; fatigue, 
hunger, uncertainty and mistake, could not fail to arise 
in a series of movements so complicated and conflict- 
ing. The control of events soon passed out of Pope's 
hands. He was in the power of Fate. Having sown 
the wind in mismanagement, he was about to reap 
the whirlwind in defeat. 

About three o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th, 
Longstreet, accompanied by Lee in person, arrived 
at Thoroughfare Gap. Though delayed by Ricketts 
until dark, he gained full possession of the Gap that 
evening, and a considerable part of his force spent the 
night on the eastern side of it. 

At sunrise the next morning (August 29th), his 
troops passed through it, and inspirited by the sound of 
battle, marched in haste to join Jackson. They reached 
their desired positions by ten or eleven o'clock. Pope 
seems not to have been aware of this, and made all 
his dispositions on that day, as if he was still dealing 



12 



with Jackson, alone and in retreat. How he could 
have formed or followed such an erroneous idea, it is 
difficult to see, for Jackson stubbornly held his position, 
and gave no sign of a retreat. Pope knew, too, that 
Longstreet was at the Gap the night before, and was 
therefore not more than ten miles f\;om fackson's posi- 
tion, with an unobstructed turnpik"^ between. But, 
whatever his theory, if he had not misused his previous 
opportunity, he would have been master of the move- 
ments of both Jackson and Longstreet, for he would 
have defended the Gap, so that Longstreet could not 
pass through it, and would have held the only road by 
which Jackson could reach it. 

After Lee's army was actually united, the only wise 
thing for Pope to do, as he himself realized, before 
fiorhtine a oreat battle, was to withdraw' to Centerville 
or some place in the rear, where he could take a 
favorable position, and rest, reorganize, re-supply and 
reenforce his wearied and famished army. 

During the 29th, occurred that series of fierce 
but detached, desultory and fruitless combats, known 
as / the battle of Groveton. The F"ederal troops 
attacked heroically, but they were in too small force 
in every instance, and were not adequately supported, 
so that they suffered great loss, without gaining any 
real success. That night and the next morning. Pope 
stubbornly refused to believe that any considerable 
part of Longstreet's force had united with Jackson, 
although he was most emphatically told by Porter and 
Reynolds, that the junction of the enemy was complete. 
Jackson's army remaineci in one place for two days and 
a half, and fought every force that came in sight ; yet 
Pope, after two days of such rough handling as his 



\ 13 

troops received, still hugged the delusion that the 
enemy were in full retreat. Although his head-quarters 
were, most of the time, within five miles of Jackson's 
lines, he seems to have been totally blind as to the 
enemy's real position and movements. Napoleon, 
whose knowledge of the art of war was equaled only 
by his knowledge of men, seems to have understood 
this kind of mental obliquity ; for he says : "The first 
qualification of a general-in-chief is to possess a cool 
head, so that things may appear to him in their true 
proportions, and as they really are. '" 
There are some men who, from their physical and moral 
constitution, deck everything in the colors of imagina- 
tion. With whatever knowledge, talents, courage, or 
other good qualities these may be endowed, nature has 
not fitted them for the command of armies, and the 
direction of the great operations of war."" 

Pope grew more sanguine as his errors developed, 
and at noon of the 30th, he ordered a vigorous pur- 
suit of the theoretically retreating enemy. For this 
purpose he weakened the left of his line to strengthen 
the right. Lee saw the movement and let it go on, for 
he desired nothing better. When it had gone far 
enough to satisfy him, he advanced his right wing, in 
the hope of reaching the turnpike in rear of Pope, and 
cutting off his retreat. The stubborn defense of the 
Henry- House Hill, by Sykes, of Porter's corps, was 
probably the only thing that prevented the execution 
of the plan, and thereby saved the Federal army from 
total rout. Pope was badly beaten, and his army 
retreated to Centerville. Lee continued his movement 
upon the Federal line of retreat, and in the afternoon 
of September ist, was fought the battle of Chantilly. 



14 

With that engagement the chapter of disasters in this 
tragedy of errors ended. McClellan was placed in 
command, and within fifteen days, gave the Army ot 
the Potomac — so sorely tried, but always faithful and 
always brave — -two victories, the first which had 
cheered it for many weeks, and the last which it was 
destined to experience for hopeless months. That 
army could not anticipate Gettysburg, the first success 
after South Mountain and the Antietam ; but it could 
remember Malvern Hill, the last victory before those 
battles, and remember too, that the glory of Malvern 
Hill belonged — first, to McClellan, and next, to Fitz- 
John Porter. 

The Charges. 

Having seen how Pope got into his " scrape," let 
us now consider how he endeavored to get his reputa- 
tion out of it. He must needs find some scapegoat to 
bear his military sins; indeed, it would seem as if it 
was almost beyond the capability of one man to make 
so many mistakes in so short a time. It was a matter 
of astonishment to the rebels themselves. Accorciingly, 
he selected General Porter as most available for the 
sacrifice. The latter had done distinguished service 
and was conspicuous as a warm friend of McClellan. 
He was also a representative of that cultured and 
conservative regular-army element which, like Napo- 
leon, clung to those antiquated notions so obnoxious 
to Pope and Stanton, " of taking strong positions and 
holding them, — of lines of retreat and of bases of 
supplies." The contempt of this element for Pope 
was quite marked. Even Lee and Jackson seem to 



15 

have shared it, for upon any other hypothesis their 
movements were reckless, ahnost to insanity. 

Pope modestly ascribed his defeat, not to its true 
cause, his own redundant incapacity, but to the mis- 
conduct of Porter. In consequence of Pope's repre- 
sentations (or misrepresentations), a court-martial was 
convened at Washington, on the 27th of November, 
1862, to try Porter upon charges which involved the 
penalty of death. The court consisted of Generals 
Hunter, Hitchcock, Prentiss, King, Ricketts, Casey, 
N. B. Buford, Slough, and Garfield, with Holt as 
Judge- Advocate-General. 

The charores were : 

I, Disobedience of orders, under the 9th Article 
of War. 

n. Misbehavior before the enemy, under the 
5 2d Article of War. 

Under the first charge there were three specifica- 
tions of which the court found Porter guilty. These 
were substantially : 

First. Disobedience to the order of August 27th, 
requiring him to march from Warrenton Junction at 
one o'clock in the morning of the 28th, and be at 
Bristoe Station by daylight. 

Second. Disobedience, on August 29th, while in 
front of the enemy, to the Joint Order to McDowell 
and Porter, directing them to march towards Gaines- 
ville and establish communication with the other corps. 
Third. Disobedience, on August 29th, while in 
front of the enemy, to what is known as the "4.30 
p. M. Order," requiring Porter to attack the enemy's 
flank and rear. 



IG 



Under the second charge, the specifications upon 
which Porter was convicted were, in substance : 

Fii'st. Shameful disobedience to the "4.30 p. m. 
Order," on August 29th, while within sight of the field, 
and in full hearing of its artillery; and retreat from 
advancing forces of the enemy, without attempting to 
engage them, or to aid the troops who were fighting 
greatly superior numbers, and who would have secured 
a decisive victory, and would have captured the enemy's 
army, but for Porter's neglect to attack, and his shameful 
disobedience. 

Second. Failure of Porter, all day on the same day, 
to bring his forces on the field, when within sound of 
the guns, and in presence of the enemy, and knowing 
that a severe action of great consequence was being 
fought, and that the aid of his corps was greatly 
needed ; and his shameful falling back and retreat 
from the advance of unknown forces of the enemy, 
without attempting to give them battle. 

Third. Shameful failure of Porter, on the same 
day, while a severe action was being fought, to go to 
the aid of General Pope's troops, believing that they 
were beino^ defeated, and were retirino- from the field ; 
and his shameful retreat away and falling back, under 
those circumstances, leaving the army to the disasters 
of a presumed defeat ; and failure, by any attempt to 
attack the enemy, to aid in averting a disaster which 
would have endangered the safety of the Capital. 

Those are the accusations, and they would be suffi- 
ciently serious, if they had any foundation in truth. 
General Gordon says that " the proceedings instigated 



17 

by Pope, were the most indefensible and tlie most 
indecent, ever submitted by our Government to the 
judgment of a court."'" 

On the 20th of June, 1878, a Board of Officers, 
consisting- of Generals Schofield, Terry and Getty, was 
convened by President Hayes, to "examine, in con- 
nection with the record of the trial by court-martial of 
Major-General Porter, such new evidence relating to 
the merits of said case as is now on file in the War 
Department, together with such other evidence as 
may be presented to said Board, and to report with 
the reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, in 
their opinion, justice requires should be taken '"• '"' '"' 
by the President." This Board, after a patient and 
thorough examination of all attainable evidence, and 
after most elaborate arguments on both sides, by coun- 
sel of exceptional learning and acuteness, rendered a 
decision showing the errors which led to the conviction 
of Porter, and completely vindicating him from all the 
charges. They say : " Porter's faithful, subordinate, 
and intelligent conduct, that afternoon (August 29th), 
saved the Union Army from the defeat which would 
otherwise have resulted, that clay, .from the enemy's 
more speedy concentration. '" '" '" " "" Porter 
had understood and appreciated the military situation, 
and so far as he had acted upon his own judgment, his 
action had been wise anci judicious." 

Let us examine the case with all the light which 
is now thrown upon it, and see whether the opinion of 
the Court-martial, or that of the Board of Officers, is 
most in accordance with the law and the evidence. 

* "The Army of Virginia from Cedar Mountain to Alexandria." George 
H. Gordon, p. 32S. 



18 

The newly-discovered evidence presented to the 
Board, was not used or desired for the purpose of 
making- a new defense ; that is, one in any way differ- 
ent from that maintained before the Court-martial. 

Porter's vindication was not an afterthought. It 
did not arise from subsequently discovered and acci- 
dental excuses for action which was reprehensible at 
the time. He based his conduct at the time upon 
what he then knew, and he justified it by that, and 
that only. He proved beyond a reasonable doubt, all 
the facts which he alleged, and which were ample for 
his justification. But the court was not convinced, 
and condemned him. The new evidence simply con- 
firms the previous defense, and conclusively establishes 
as absolute truth, what the Court-martial chose to con- 
sider baseless pretense. 

There is one accusation which requires no argu- 
ment, and may as well be disposed of summarily. That 
is, all the matter relating to a retreat, whether shame- 
ful or otherwise. There was no retreat by Porter, as 
charged, and no semblance of any ; nor was there any 
evidence of a retreat. In fact, the evidence was posi- 
tive to the contrary. The verdict upon this point was 
made, as the saying is, "out of whole cloth." It was 
simply false. Some exercise of imagination is neces- 
sary to account for it, and more of charity to excuse it. 

Taking the accusations in their order, the first 
relates to 

The Night-march from Warrenton Junction to 
Bristoe Station. 

On the night of the 27th of August, Porter was 
at Warrenton Junction with orders to march to Green- 
wich as soon as Banks should relieve him at the 



19 

Junction. His corps numbered about lo.ooo men. 
One of his divisions had marched that chiy from 
twelve to fourteen miles ; the other, nineteen or 
twenty miles. The troops had been marching with 
but little intermission for thirteen days previously, 
sometimes by night as well as by day, and always 
rapidly. They were very much worn with fatigue, 
and had suffered greatly from the heat, dust, and lack 
of food and water. For several days they had lived 
upon a scanty supply of coffee, hard bread and sugar, 
or upon what they could pick up in the neighboring 
cornfields and orchards. Morell's division which had 
marched the farthest that day, did not reach camp 
until after sunset, and from the delay in getting supper, 
the men were not in bed at ten o'clock. About that 
hour Porter received the following order : 

Head-quarters, Army of Virginia, 

Bristoiv Station, August 27, 1862. 
6. JO p. m. 
General : — The Major-General commanding, 
directs that you start at one o'clock to-night, and come 
forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is 
with you, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow 
morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with 
the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed 
and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, but 
is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him 
from Manassas, and clear the country between that 
place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell 
has not joined you, send word to him to push forward 
immediately ; also send word to Banks to hurry forward 
with all speed to take your place at Warrenton Junc- 
tion. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should 
be here by daylight. I send an officer with this dis- 
patch, who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to 



20 



send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayette- 
ville, probably in the direction of Beahon. Say to 
Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad 
trains to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with 
you, write him to that effect. 

By command of Major- General Pope, 

George D. Ruggles, 
Colonel and Chief of Staf^. 
Major- General F. J. Porter, 

War7'enton yunctioii. 
P. S. If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, 
leave a regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery 
as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow 
you immediately. If Banks is not at the Junction, 
instruct Colonel Clary to run the trains back to this 
side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of 
artillery with it. 

By command of Major-General Pope. 

George D. Ruggles, 
Colonel and Chief of Staff 

The distance to Bristoe Station was ten miles. 
The only road leading there from Warrenton Junction 
was crooked and narrow, in some places not more than 
ten feet wide. It ran, for a considerable part of the 
way, either through or along the edge of dense woods. 
It was full of little stumps, and seemed to be a newly 
cut military road. It was crossed by a dozen or more 
small streams, whose beds were like quicksand, and 
whose banks were either swampy and fringed with 
thick bushes, or so high and abrupt as to be difficult of 
ascent. It was encumbered at this time by the wagons 
of the whole army, some 2,000 to 3,000 in number, 
which had been pouring into it from two directions 
during the entire day. In its windings, it several times 
crossed the railroad track, upon which, by General 



21 



Pope's order, trains were running during the greater 
part of the night. Such was the road over which the 
troops were obhged to march. There were no open 
fields which they could take. The adjacent country 
was in some places swampy, and the open spaces which 
would have been otherwise passable, were occupied by 
the wagons parked in confusion. 

At ten o'clock, the time when the order was 
received, the night was extremely dark. Even a 
witness for the prosecution says that it was as black 
a time for a while as he ever saw; he could not see 
six feet except by the flashes of lightning. General 
Roberts who made the charges, and Colonel Marston, 
a witness for the prosecution, both say it was quite 
dark ; the latter was out on a picket line and lost 
his way. 

General Patrick says : " It was one of the darkest 
of nights." Lieutenant-Colonel Brinton, with two 
officers, was two hours in going three miles on horse- 
back along the road described. He says that they 
ran into a tree upon one side, or a wagon on the other, 
without seeing it until they were upon it. In the open 
plain they could not see a wagon fifteen feet off. He 
lost his way, as did many officers that night, going 
singly or with escorts and guides. Colonel Ruggles 
was lost in going a few hundred feet from the bivouac. 
The whole night was cloudy and threatening. About 
ten o'clock, and again before morning, there was a 
drizzling rain. 

Altogether, thirteen witnesses, two of them for the 
prosecution, swore before the Court-martial that the 
night was quite dark ; many said ver\', or unusually, 
or extremely dark. Their testimony is supplemented 



22 



and strengthened by the statements, before the recent 
Board of Officers, of fourteen others to the same effect. 
The experiences hereafter related will show whether 
those opinions were well founded or not. 

Upon the receipt of the order, General Porter 
stated its purport to his principal officers, Generals 
Svkes, Morell and Butterheld, and handed it to them 
to read. They earnestly remonstrated against start- 
ing at the time named. Porter replied in substance, 
"There is the order; it must be obeyed." The 
officers urged the fatigue of the men, the darkness of 
the night, the obstructions in the road, the loss by 
straggling, and the delay and confusion wdiich would 
inevitably ensue, as reasons for postponing the march 
until daylight. They further argued that they could 
make more effective progress, and the troops would 
be of more service, by starting at daylight than at one 
o'clock. The officer who brought the order had been 
three hours and twenty minutes on the way. He said 
that it was very dark, and he had experienced much 
difficulty with the wagons. Porter had been informed 
by his own officers, earlier in the evening, of the bad 
condition and obstruction of the road. "After consid- 
erable discussion, and with a good deal of reluctance," 
he partially yielded to the protests of his officers, but 
ordered them to move promptly at three o'clock. 

There were other considerations which were obvious 
to Porter, in connection with Pope's order. 

First. Literal compliance with it was impossible 
in the time mentioned. To start at one o'clock and 
reach Bristoe at daylight, allowed only three hours for 
a march of ten miles. Three miles an hour is very 
rapid marching for troops on a good road and with 



23 



daylight. Yet Porter was expected to march at that 
rate or faster, over such a road as he had, and in the 
darkest part of an unusually dark night. In other 
words, he was required to take 10,000 foot-soldiers 
broken down with fatigue, a given distance, in less time 
than that necessarily taken by a single horseman with 
an urgent order. 

Second. Although the order was sufficiently urgent, 
as were most of Pope's orders during all the time 
of these events, yet it gave the reasons for haste, 
and those reasons hardly bore out the urgency of its 
terms. They showed that the purpose of the order 
was not to meet any present danger of attack, but to 
pursue a retreating enemy and drive him from the sur- 
rounding country. The march to Bristoe was only 
the first step in a movement which required further 
marching for an indefinite distance, and perhaps fight- 
ing. As the literal execution of the order would have 
been very difficult under any circumstances, and was 
wholly impossible, as we have seen, under those exist- 
ing, it was a matter of discretion with Porter so to use 
his men that they would be most effective for carrying 
out the general purpose of his commander. The 
question occurred to Porter, whether it would best 
subserve that purpose to call his weary men up at 
half-past eleven o'clock — for it was necessary to sound 
the reveille at least an hour and a half before starting — 
and keep them on their feet, uselessly waiting or hope- 
lessly laboring until daylight for the removal of obsta- 
cles which, by daylight, could be easily dispersed, and 
then bring them in unfit for further service until after 
a long rest ; or to rest for a few hours, and thereby 
enable them to accomplish the march with comparative 



24 



ease, arrive as soon as they could otherwise, and be 
fit for anything that might be afterwards required of 
them. To needlessly deprive the troops of rest, that 
they might reach Bristoe no earlier, and then be 
obliged to halt half of the day from weariness, would 
have been about as senseless a thing as Porter could 
do ; for, to the uselessness of the force would have 
been added the straggling and general demoralization 
which fatigue produces. 

Third. The order directed Porter to come forward 
w^ith his "w/ioie corps ^^ or such part of it as was with 
him. Under this, he would not have been justified in 
attempting to hasten his march, by taking his infantry 
and leaving his artillery. The exception in the post- 
script of the order, in reference to leaving a section of 
artillery in a certain contingency, implied as strongly 
as could be, that he was expected to bring the rest of 
his artillery with him. 

But, it may be said, if Porter knew the difficulties, 
and could not effect the desired object by starting at 
one o'clock, that was the stronoest reason for starting- 
earlier rather than later. So it was, if men were 
mere machines, driven by a force which requires no 
rest, and which can be turned on and off at pleasure. 
If anything was to be gaineci in the darkness, and the 
men could endure the fatigue, Porter's duty certainly 
was to urge them forward, trom the time he received 
the order ; but of the advantage of moving, and of the 
condition of the men, he was the sole responsible 
judge. The question with him was, how could he 
soonest reach Bristoe, with his troops in condition tor 
further service ? He yielded his own desire to move 
at the time mentioned in the order, to the better 



25 



judgment of subordinates whose zeal and capacity 
were never questioned ; and in so doinc/ he acted 
wisely. He gave his tired troops a few hours of 
needed rest, and accomphshed all that could have 
been effected in many hours of darkness. His only 
fault was in not deferring the time of starting until 
daylight. 

He did not leave Pope in ignorance of the situa- 
tion, but wrote him stating the difficulties, and asking 
for cavalry (as Porter had none), to clear the road. 
Pope admits receiving that dispatch before daylight ; 
and he also admits that he received one or more 
requests to have his end of the road cleared ; but, as 
in the case of several other writings which were of 
value to Porter, the dispatches were demanded of 
Pope, but were never produced. Porter also reqested 
Lieutenant-Colonel Brinton who arrived about twelve 
o'clock, to bring up some of the First Maine Cavalry 
from Catlett's Station. He sent out two officers to 
explore the way, and they were obliged to dismount 
and feel for the road. Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, 
Porter's Chief of Staff, was severely injured by falling 
over a stump in the middle of the camp. 

At three o'clock, when the march commenced, the 
obstacles encountered fully equaled the expectations. 
It was with great difficulty that officers formed their 
commands, or men found their places in the ranks. An 
aid-de-camp who was sent to find the way, and guide 
the column, though assisted by several soldiers, re- 
turned and said he could not distinguish the road. 
The leading brigade was obliged to light candles in 
going through the woods. Artillery and wagons were 
mired not five hundred yards from the camp ; the 
wheels sank up to the hubs in the marshy soil. 



26 

Lieutenant (now Major) Randol, a most capable 
officer and remarkably Intelligent witness, says that 
with all the ingenuity he could use in cutting his way, 
and extemporizing a crossing, it took him tiuo hours to 
get his battery across one stream. By the time the com- 
mands were fairly extricated from the camp, they came 
upon the wagon-train. Wagons and artillery were 
stalled on both sides of the streams, and in the middle 
of them. Wagons blocked the road, and were four or 
five deep on the sides of the road. General Warren 
says they were "pell-mell, — 'parked^ like a lot of ice 
that jamis in on the shore." That describes the condi- 
tion vividly. Many miles of such confusion had to be 
cleared up, when it was so dark that one could not 
distinguish a wagon five yards off The teamsters 
were insubordinate, and were acting without system, 
and under no authority. They had not seen a wagon- 
master for a week, and were going independently, they 
said. When driven off the road, they would turn into 
it again, and thereby break up the commands and cause 
great disorder and delay. General Sykes was obliged 
to station officers with drawn swords, to keep them 
back. Another officer threatened to shoot them. 
Sykes says that he never had so much trouble with 
wagons in his life. He was obliged to halt his brigades 
for an hour, on account of wagons intervening. Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Locke says that the work at Savage's 
Station and White-Oak Swamp was holiday work to 
that. Many of the troops were under arms at two 
o'clock, and remained in the road until daylight or 
after, waiting to take their places in the column. This 
experience amply justifies the judgment of Porter and 
his principal officers, as to the uselessness of starting 
any earlier than they did. Porter wisely refrained 



27 

from harassing his men, by trying to do what he knew 
to be impossible. It was proved, and was admitted 
by a witness for the prosecution, that General Porter 
personally, and his entire staff, used great exertions 
to clear the way and expedite the march. But little 
progress could be made until daylight ; after that, the 
difficulties were more easily overcome, and the com- 
mand made good speed to its destination. General 
Porter rode on ahead and reported to Pope about 
eight o'clock in the morning, and his corps was fully 
up by ten o'clock, or a little after. 

A march of ten miles in seven hours, under such 
difficulties, indicates not only very creditable, but 
extraordinary celerity. The experience of other per- 
sons and other commands, on the same night, will 
afford us a good standard of comparison. Two 
officers of General Pope's staff, mounted of course, 
with a guide, left Warrenton Junction for Bristoe at 
midnight, lost their way, and did not reach their desti- 
nation until seven o'clock in the morning. General 
McKeever, with a small escort, required four hours to 
ride over the same road in the afternoon of the 27th. 
General Patrick, of King's division, was from dusk 
until midnioht, about five hours, in marching seven 
or eight miles, on a turnpike road. At ten o'clock, 
the time when Porter received his order, Patrick's 
orderlies and a part of his staff dismounted to feel for 
the road. He himself was lost. Men were placed 
across the road, lest the commands should pass the 
points where they were expected to bivouac. It was 
so dark, that the openings on the side of the road 
could not be seen. 

Ricketts, with his division, started at two o'clock 
in the morning, marched on a fine turnpike road 



28 



obstructed by only 200 wagons, and in nine hours had 
not eone twice the length of the division front from 
where he started. The part of this command to which 
Captain Duryea belonged left Warrenton by daylight, 
and was engaged until midnight in marching three or 
four miles. The troops were obliged to halt every ten 
or fifteen minutes. The commands of Kearney and 
Reno reached Bristoe about the same time that Porter 
did, although they had marched only four miles, and 
had been ordered, as Pope expressed it to Kearney, 
in language of oriental fervor, " at the very earliest 
blush of dawn,'' to push forward with all speed, so as 
to '' bag the whole crozud^ Yet Porter's alleged delay, 
which in reality was no delay at all, was a willful viola- 
tion of orders, because to one of Pope's staff officers 
he looked as if he was a traitor ! And the Court- 
martial listened to such contemptible nonsense, and 
condemned a o-allant and faithful soldier. 

Porter gave his troops two hours of needed rest, 
and reached his destination as soon as he could have 
reached it if he had started earlier. The most effective 
part of his march must have been made after daylight, 
in either case ; but in the one his troops were in con- 
dition for further service, and in the other they would 
have been useless. As it was, he arrived at Bristoe 
in time for every purpose for which Pope required 
him. The two hours delay in starting made no 
difference to Pope whatever. Porter was at hand for 
disposal as Pope saw fit. Pope had " much conversa- 
tion " with him that morning, and made no complaint 
of the delay — " said nothing about obeying or diso- 
beying." He afterwards expressed himself as satisfied 
with Porter's whole conduct, excepting one trivial 
matter which even the Court-martial ignored. 



29 



Pope made no plans or disposition of liis forces, 
different from what he would have made if the delay- 
had not occurred. He said that the necessity had 
passed. The movement he was makino, was the with- 
drawal from Gainesville, the most fatal error of that 
lonof series of errors, and he was soon oblioed to coun- 
termand it. If anybody was to be cashiered for the 
false movements of that day. it should have been Pope, 
not Porter. 

Despite the urgency of the summons. Pope had no 
use for Porter after he o-ot him. The latter remained 
at Bristoe the entire day and night of the twenty- 
eighth. Twice during the day, he sent to Pope for 
orders, and twice received the answer, " Tell him to stay 
where he is ; when wanted he will be sent for." It was 
not until about six o'clock in the morning of the 29th, 
that he received orders to move. 

In judging of Porter's conduct throughout these 
events, we must bear in mind the rule which results 
from the ever-varying nature of circumstances in mili- 
tary affairs. It is stated by Napoleon, and is so well 
settled as to have become a maxim. He says: "An 
order requires passive obedience only when it is given 
by a superior who is present on the spot, at the 
moment when he gives it. As the superior is then 
familiar with the state of affairs, he can listen to objec- 
tions, and make the necessary explanations to the 
officer who is to execute the order." 

It follows therefore, that, in the absence of the 
superior, an officer is always justified in using a rea- 
sonable discretion. As far as circumstances will admit, 
he is expected to comply with the spirit of the order, 
but he is not a slave to its letter. 



30 



Porter used his discretion in this instance, right- 
fully and reasonably. His "disobedience" consists 
solely in his not doing an impossible act for a useless 
purpose. 

On this head, we may justly conclude : 

First. That it was absolutely impossible for 
Porter to obey the order literally. 

Second. It being so, he had a right to use his dis- 
cretion as to the manner in which he could best tlilfill 
the intention of his commander. 

Third. He used that discretion reasonably and 
efficiently. 

Fourth. His action, whether right or wrong, 
proved to be of no earthly importance. 

There was nothing in Porter's conduct in this 
instance, to base charges upon, and nothing deserving 
the name of evidence, upon which to found a convic- 
tion. But a Court which could find the fact of a 
retreat when there was no retreat and no evidence of 
any, could as easily find the fact of disobedience, when 
there was no disobedience and no evidence of any. 
It is but fair to assume that this charge relating to the 
28th of August, was entirely an afterthought — a make- 
weight — and would never have been heard of, but 
for the occurrences of the succeding day, and Pope's 
inglorious failure. 

As the charges of disobedience of orders and 
"shameful behavior" on that day, grow out of the 
same events, and are closely interwoven, we will treat 
of them together. By knowing exactly what Porter 
was able to do, and what he did, we can judge whether 
he disobeyed or committed any "shameful" act. 



31 

Events of the 29T11 of August. 

Pope swore before the Court-martial that he feared 
the arrival of Longstreet at any moment, and expected 
it certainly during the afternoon of the 29th, (and 
there was every reason why he should have expected 
it earlier) ; yet in the orders which he issued to 
Porter about ten o'clock in the morning of that day, 
he says : " The indications are that the whole force of 
the enemy is moving in this direction, at a pace that 
will bring them here (Centerville) by to-viorrozv nio-JU 
or next day!' 

Again, Pope stated in his Report to the Committee 
on the Conduct of the War, (and he has sworn to sub- 
stantially the same thing), that about sunset of the 29th, 
the main body of Longstreet's force began to reach the 
field ; that he is " positive," up to five o'clock in the 
afternoon, Porter had in his front no considerable force 
of the enemy; that he "believed then," as he is "very 
sure" afterwards, that Porter might have turned Jack- 
son's flank and attacked his rear, up to eight o'clock 
in the evening, before Jackson could, by any possibility, 
have been sufficiently reenforced ; that during the 
whole night of the 29th, and until noon of the 30th, 
the advance of the main army under Lee was arriving 
on the field, with fresh forces even then coming from 
the Gap, In other words, Pope claims that Lee was 
tzventy-four hours behind time, in going a little over 
nine miles ; and that there was not a rebel on the field, 
excepting Jackson, until night, and very few then ; yet 
we find him writing to Halleck, early the next morning, 
August 30th : " We fought a terrific battle here yester- 
day with the coiubined forces of the enemy, which lasted 
with continuous fury from daylight until after dark." 



32 



How these and many conflicting statements of 
Pope's are to be reconciled, can be known only when 
the Recording Angel exhibits and explains the com- 
plicated entries which must have resulted from this 
campaign. Pope himself declined the opportunity for 
explanation when he was invited to testify before the 
Board of Officers. All of those statements cannot 
truly indicate what Pope believed. The question 
arises, did he intend to deceive his subordinate at the 
time, and thereby entrap him into a false movement 
which would cover his own delinquencies in case of 
failure, or did he afterwards intend to deceive the 
public and the Court, and thereby secure the condem- 
nation of that subordinate, when on trial for his life, 
after Pope's failure was complete ? It is difficult to 
decide which is the more charitable view to take 
of such contradictions. I am disposed to conclude 
that Pope really did believe what he said in his order, 
and did not believe what he said afterwards, though 
when he knew Longstreet had possession of the Gap 
the night before, it is hard to see how he could sup- 
pose that the latter would be from thirty to forty-eight 
hours in marching fifteen miles, to Centerville. On 
the other hand, it is almost equally hard to understand 
how he could expect Longstreet to be from the night 
of the 28th till the afternoon of the 29th in marching- 
nine miles to Jackson's position. It is a puzzle in 
either view. Pope's ideas of the rebel movements 
throughout, were so erratic, that it is doubtful if he 
had at any time a clear discernment of what he really 
did think. His was a case of "mournful obstinacy in 
seeing things not as they were, but as he thought it to 
his interest they should be."'"' His erroneous belief 

* Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. Dorsey Gardner. 



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Alaplejyafley 



Operations of August 29th. 



This map is compiled from maps contained in two works of the highest excellence anc 
interest, viz. : "The Army under Pope," by Mr. John C. Ropes, published by Charles Scribner's 
Sons, New York, and "The Army of Virginia from Cedar Mountain to Alexandria," b} 
General George H. Gordon, published by Houghton, Osgood and Company, Boston. 

My thanks are due to Mr. Ropes, General Gordon and Charles Scribner's Sons, for theii 
kindness in permitting the use of their maps. Their permission was specially given to me solel) 
for this purpose. 



certainly furnished a very bad omen for the operations 
of that day. 

Durincr the nioiit of the 28th, believino- that Kine 
had intercepted Jackson's retreat, Pope ordered the 
whole army to begin the pursuit at daylight the next 
morning. But this pursuit seems to have been by 
a sort of inverse movement, for he ordered the com- 
mands of Hooker and Porter to march to Center ville, 
the farthest point in the rear yet reached, expecting 
them to fall in behind Kearney who was to advance 
at an earlier hour directly down the turnpike. Porter 
was at Bristoe station where we left him, and had 
he been ordered to march towards Groveton by the 
Sudley Springs road, he would have saved about 
ten miles of distance and a corresponding length of 
time. When he received the order, about six o'clock 
in the mornino-, it was evident to him from the loca- 
tion of the battle of the previous night, and from the 
cannonade already in progress that morning, that 
the enemy were near Groveton and far from Cen- 
terville. Though he realized the error, he obeyed 
promptly, and had gone two miles and a half beyond 
Manassas, when he received the usual countermand 
by an order, first oral and afterwards in writing, as 
follows : 

Head-quarters Army of Virginia, 

Centerville, August 29, 1862. 
Push forward with your corps and King's division, 
which you will take with you, upon Gainesville. I am 
following the enemy down the Warrenton turnpike. 
Be expeditious or we will lose much. 

John Pope, 
Major-General commanding. 
Major-General Porter. 



34 

The reason for this order was that Pope had 
learned early in the morning of King's retreat to 
Manassas. He knew that the way was open for 
Jackson's escape, and he greatly feared that the latter 
would not stay to undergo the bagging process. 
Accordingly, he ordered Sigel to attack the enemy 
as soon as it was light enough to see, and if possible 
bring him to a stand. By sending Porter with a 
strong force in the direction of Gainesville, he hoped 
to repair the error of abandoning that place the day 
before. Soon after this order was issued. Pope heard 
that Ricketts had been driven from the Gap by Long- 
street the niofht before, and had retired he knew not 
where. There was nothing, therefore, to prevent the 
junction of the rebel forces, unless Porter could reach 
Gainesville before that event could occur. Herein, 
Pope committed that old error, of which history fur- 
nishes so many lamentable examples, and military 
science such positive prohibitions, of directing con- 
verging columns upon a point which the enemy can 
reach first. Even before Porter received his order, 
Longstreet's troops were marching through Gaines- 
ville, and the junction with Jackson was virtually com- 
plete. About nine o'clock or half-past nine. Porter 
repassed Manassas, and pursued his march towards 
Gainesville on the road leading past Bethlehem Church. 
At Manassas he was joined by McDowell, and from 
him learned the situation of the night before, and the 
imminence of Longstreet's arrival. McDowell was 
aggrieved that King's division had been taken from 
him and oriven to Porter, and Porter was dissatisfied 
because the orders which he received were so conflict- 
ing, and were delivered, sometimes orally, by persons 



35 



whom he did not know and of whose authority he 
was not certain. The remonstrances of both officers 
reached Pope about the same time. To satisfy both, 
he sent to them what is known as 

" The Joint Order." 
It was as folio w^s : 

Head-quarters Army of Virginia, 

Centerville, August 29, 1862. 
Generals McDoivell and Porter : 

You will please move forward with your joint com- 
mands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter 
written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. 
Heintzelman, Siijel and Reno are movinof on the War- 
renton Turnpike, and must now be not far from Gaines- 
ville. I desire that as soon as communication is 
established between this force and your own, the whole 
command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back 
behind Bull Run at Centerville, to-night. I presume 
it will be so on account of our supplies. I have sent 
no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to 
interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's 
troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last 
night ; which were to hold his position on the Warren- 
ton Turnpike until the troops from here should fall 
upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even 
know Ricketts' position, as I had not been able to find 
out wdiere General McDowell w^as until a late hour this 
morning. General McDowell will take immediate 
steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and in- 
struct him to rejoin the other divisions of the corps as 
soon as practicable. 

If any considerable advantages are to be gained by 
departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried 
out. One thing must be had in view, that the troops 
must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull 
Run to-niohtor 1)v mornino-. The intlications are that 



36 

the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direc- 
tion at a pace that will . bring" them here by to-morrow 
night or next day. My own head-quarters will be for 
the present with Heintzelman's corps, or at this place. 

John Pope, 
Major-General commanding. 

Porter had continued his march from Manassas for 
five miles aloncr the road to Gainesville, until, about 
half-past eleven in the morning, he reached a small 
stream called Davvkins Branch. There two scouts 
were captured, who said that they were Longstreet's 
men, and that Longstreet's corps was in Porter's front. 

On the hills a little distance in advance, the ene- 
my's skirmishers were seen, while beyond, in the road 
in front, and on the turnpike, clouds of dust which rose 
above the trees, indicated the presence ot a large force. 
Porter following his orders to push forward with King's 
division upon Gainesville, prepared for action. He 
threw out a regiment of skirmishers, deployed his lead- 
ing division in line of battle, and sent Butterfield's 
brigade across the stream, to occupy a commanding- 
hill. The skirmishers were exchanging a few shots 
with the enemy, when about noon an officer arrived 
with the Joint Order. Shortly afterwards McDowell, 
who had accompanied the column from Manassas, rode 
to the front and showed to Porter his copy of the order. 
Before the receipt of that order, there is little doubt 
that McDowell had no authority over Porter, and he 
exercised none ; after its receipt, it is certain that he, 
as the ranking officer, was entitled to command the 
whole force, while he remained with it. The condi- 
tions were precisely those contemplated by the (old) 
62d Article of War. This was understood and 
accepted by both. McDowell saw the preparations 



37 



for attack, and heard the shots of the skirmishers. 
Almost the first thing said by him was, " Porter, this is 
no place to fight a battle ; you are too far out already. 
Put your troops back into the woods," or words to that 
effect. In consequence of these suggestions, which 
were in reality orders. Porter suspended his prepara- 
tions for attack. McDowell showed him a dispatch 
just received from General Buford, stating that seven- 
teen regiments, one battery and 500 cavalry had passed 
through Gainesville at a quarter before nine o'clock 
that morning. This they knew of course was a part 
of Longstreet's corps which had driven Ricketts from 
the Gap the night before, and they also knew that the 
rest of his command would be closely following. The 
appearances in their front, the capture of the scouts 
and the dispatch of Buford indicated, unmistakably, 
that Longstreet's force was before them, and that the 
rebel army was united. 

They discussed the Joint Order, especially the 
requirement imperatively repeated, that they should 
be in a position from which they could reach Bull Run 
that night or the next morning. It was doubtless 
that requirement which McDowell had in mind, when 
he said, " You are too far out already ; that is, too far 
from the rest of the army, and the point of concentra- 
tion behind Bull Run. They were then, at noon, 
eight miles from Bull Run, and the troo[)s were in a 
condition bordering on starvation. 

An advance was evidently impossible without 
fighting a battle, and a battle, especially against 
Longstreet's corps, was forbidden by the tenor of the 
Joint Order ; for besides the necessity of supplies, it 
was the expected arrival of his force, that was given 



38 



as a reason for the imperative injunction to retire. 
McDowell and Porter rode over to the ri^ht to see if 
they could not, by a flank march across the country, 
establish the communication directed by the order. 
This was found to be impracticable, and it was finally 
agreed that the best way to carry out the purpose of 
the order, under the discretion allowed by it, was for 
McDowell to take King's division of 8,000 men, 
march up the Sudley Springs road, directing Ricketts 
to follow, and thereby form a connection with the 
other corps. Almost immediately McDowell started. 

It is certain that McDowell gave up the idea of 
Porter's further advance, or of his fiorhtinof in that 
place, as soon as he decided to take King and Ricketts 
away ; for he remarked to General Patrick, soon after- 
wards, " Porter has gone as far as he can go ; " and 
McDowell certainly would not have withdrawn 15,000 
men, to go he knew not where, at the very moment 
when he expected an attack to be made by the 
remaining 10,000. 

It is manifest, and McDowell testifies, that up to 
the time when he left, which was shortly after twelve 
o'clock, everything was done by the joint force that 
should have been clone. If not, then the fault was 
McDowell's and not Porter's. After the receipt of 
the Joint Order, Porter was a subordinate, and could 
do nothing without McDowell's consent. It was for 
McDowell to say whether there should be a halt, or an 
attack, or, as he finally decided, a separation of their 
forces. If he had wished to attack, he had immedi- 
ately in hand 17,000 or 18,000 men, and by ordering 
up Ricketts, could have controlled a force of 25,000. 
They were tired and hungry to be sure, but still 



30 



effective. If an attack was to be made at all, it should 
have been made with all the force available, and 
McDowell was too experienced a soldier to think 
otherwise. He is in no wise to blame for not makin^j 
an attack. Under the injunctions of the Joint Order 
and the evident necessities of the army, as he said, it 
was no place to fight a battle. An isolated engage 
ment, even with 25,000 men, without communication 
and without supports, against a presumably superior 
and actually equal force of the enemy, on their own 
ground and with full facility of concentration, would 
have been a hazardous and reckless undertaking. 
Such a rash venture was not warranted either by sound 
military principles or by the terms of the Joint Order. 
The order was to effect communication, then halt, and 
afterwards retire. 

Even the discretion allowed was limited by the 
one consideration which was to be steadily kept in 
view, viz.: the necessity of retiring behind Bull Run, 
because the enemy who then actually confronted them, 
was slowly coming ! The order implied that, if they 
were to fight at all, especially against Lee's united 
army, the battle should be behind Bull Run. The 
rules of the military art dictated the same thing. Pope 
has testified that he did not desire to pursue Jackson, 
even if alone, farther than Gainesville, on account of 
the necessity of retiring for supplies. It must be 
admitted that an order to march tmtil conumLiiication is 
established, then to halt, and afterwards retreat, is not 
of such an inspiring character that, like Colonel Ham- 
ilton's speech at Yorktown, it would lead a man to 
''storm Heir' in response to it ! 



40 



McDowell wisely refrained from battle then and 
there, and properly decided to use the discretion allowed 
by the letter of the order, to carry out its spirit. He 
took the divisions of Ricketts and King, and went to 
seek the communication which could not otherwise 
be had. 

Porter was convicted of disobeying the Joint Order. 
But in what did that disobedience consist.-^ His actions 
are well known, and the order speaks for itself. There 
cannot be pointed out one particular in which he dis- 
obeyed it. He was directed to march tozuards Gaines- 
ville, and he did so, as far as he could go. He could 
not o'O far enouoh to effect the communication with the 
other corps, because the enemy stopped him ; and for 
a similar reason the other corps could not reach the 
place where they were expected to be. This Porter 
knew, by the cannonade that he could hear east of 
Groveton, by Buford's dispatch, and by the dust on the 
turnpike. Therefore, if by any means he had gone all 
the way to Gainesville, he would not have accomplished 
what the order intended ; for the other corps were four 
miles and more from Gainesville, and never got any 
nearer. He did not fight it is true, but a direction to 
fight cannot be wrung from the terms of the Joint Order; 
nor can any meaning be derived from it, even from 
the discretionary part, which does not discountenance 
a battle in front of Bull Run. So it appeared to 
McDowell, when he had control of a force of 25,000 
men. When he declined to fight with that force, and 
took it away, as he had a right to do, if he saw fit, it 
was certainly not Porter's duty to fight alone, nor would 
he have been justified in doing so. If the Joint Order 



41 



did not command McDowell to fight, it did not com- 
mand Porter to fight. As he disobeyed it in no other 
respect, it may be asked, upon what ground then did 
the Court-martial condemn him ? We are obliged to 
rely upon conjecture for the answer, just as the Court 
relied upon it for the facts ; and the only rational 
theory that we can frame to account for so strange a 
conclusion, is, that it was the result of the same kind 
of judicial jt-igglery that could exhibit the fact of a re- 
treat when there was no retreat. 

It seems there was something said by McDowell 
which was erroneously construed into an order to fight. 
It made no difference that the remark with its atten- 
dant circumstances was not susceptible of such a 
construction ; that it was not understood by Porter, 
and would not have been binding upon him if it had 
been understood ; that it would have been ill-judged if 
it meant what it was supposed to mean ; or that it 
came from McDowell when Porter was charged with 
disobedience of Pope. All this was ignored. There 
was a supposed order to fight, and Porter did not 
fight ; so, because it was erroneously supposed that he 
disobeyed McDowell's order, he was convicted of dis- 
obeying Pope's order. That is certainly the most 
charitable theory by which to account for the verdict. 
If that was not the reason for it, then, like the finding 
in respect to the retreat, there was no reason for it. 

There is considerable dispute as to what directions 
McDowell gave Porter when he decided to go away. 
McDowell admits that they were vague, and does not 
fully recollect what conversation he had with Porter. 
He thinks he said to Porter : " You put your force in 
here, and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road, 



42 



on the left of the troops engaged at that point with the 
enemy," or something to that effect. This, Porter has 
always denied ; and it is in evidence that, as McDowell 
rode away, Porter called to him : "What shall I do ?'" 
To this McDowell made no response, except by a 
wave of the hand, and Porter saw him no more that 
day. Whatever McDowell said was evidently not 
understood by Porter ; and it would not be material 
now, if it had not apparently formed the ground of the 
very false conclusion by the Court-martial, 

No argument is needed to show the inexcusable 
nature of a verdict based upon such a total variance 
between the allegation and the proof. McDowell's 
remark, however it may be interpreted, was not an 
order which was binding upon Porter, after McDowell 
left him. ; more especially, if it was opposed to the 
spirit of the order of their common superior. General 
Pope. Even if Porter heard the remark, he could not 
properly derive from it, the meaning ascribed to it by 
the Court. He could not suppose that McDowell 
meant for him to attack, then and there, with 10,000 
men or less, when McDowell was withdrawing 15,000 
troops to go he knew not how far away. McDowell 
was too good a soldier to order an attack in that man- 
ner, and Porter was too good a soldier to suppose that 
he would be expected to attack unknown numbers in 
that manner. If McDowell made that remark, "you 
put your force in here ;" Porter could only understand, 
under the circumstances, what McDowell doubtless 
intended to be understood, that the expression referred 
to place, and not to time or manner. It meant, not, 
put your force in now, but when you put your force in, 
do so here. It meant, not, fight a battle alone with a 



diminished force and without communication, but, you 
remain here for future operations, while I go to estab- 
lish the communication directed by the order. This 
view is borne out by McDowell's testimony, where he 
says : " I did not venture to do anything more than 
indicate Xho. place where I thought he was to apply that 
force ;" and that a skirmish line, if it was according 
to Porter's discretion, would have fulfilled the order. 
It is evident the order meant nothing more than for 
Porter to stay where he was. In this view, and in 
this only, the remark in question is consistent with 
the other expressions which McDowell is shown to 
have used about the same time, that this was too far 
out, and " no place to fight a battle," (as they were 
then situated), and again, "Say to him (General Porter) 
that I am ooinof to the riaht, and will take General 
Kina with me. I think he had better remain where 
he is, but if it is necessary for him to fall back, he 
can do so upon my left." Can it be supposed that 
McDowell would order an immediate attack with 
10,000 men, when he thought it was too far out, and 
no place to fight in, with 25,000 men ? 

When McDowell declined to make an attack in 
that position with 25,000 men, and took away 15,000 
of them into the wilderness. Porter supposed, as it was 
reasonable to suppose, that he did so for the purpose 
of bringing the whole army into communication, in 
accordance with the intent of the Joint Order, and 
with sound military judgment. Porter did not and 
could not suppose, that he was expected to attack, or 
would be justified in attacking, before that communica- 
tion was established, and McDowell was in a position 
to co-operate with him. As war is not a conjectural 



44 



science, he was right in waiting until he knew whether 
that co-operation was assured or not. In fact, he 
heard no more from McDowell until night, and during 
all the afternoon he was left to his own resources and 
the guidance of his own judgment. 

McDowell's suggestions, whether they were, to 
fight, or not to fight, did not add to, or diminish 
Porter's responsibility, after McDowell left him. Nor 
did they afford him any guidance, except to influence 
him to remain where he was, and await further knowl- 
edge of McDowell's movements. 

It was Porter's duty to act for himself according 
to the best light that he could obtain from the orders 
before him, and from sound military principles. 

We have seen that when Porter commanded King's 
division in addition to his own, and was acting upon 
his own responsibility, under orders to march to 
Gainesville, he prepared to fight his way there. He 
desisted from attack, only when he was superseded by 
McDowell, under orders which discountenanced a 
battle ; and was actually directed by him, not to fight. 
If a battle was to be fought by virtue of the discretion 
allowed, it was McDowell's duty to fight it, and not 
Porter's, after McDowell left him. When McDowell, 
for good reason, declined to fight then and there. 
Porter, with a greatly diminished force, was certainly 
absolved from fighting. We conclude, therefore, that 
Porter did not violate any order, Pope's or McDowell's, 
in not fiohtinof. 

But when his orders failed to provide for the 
emergency and he was left to his own discretion, did 
he err in the exercise of it } I think not, in any 
particular, but if opinions differ upon that point, I 



45 

would suor-0-est one consideration which will ofo far to 
extenuate the error. It is, that distrust of the com- 
mander is a very imi)ortant factor in estimating- the 
elements whicli go to make up the judgment of a 
subordinate. How can the subordinate intelligently 
exercise his discretion to carry out the plan of his 
commander, when he has c^ood reason to think that 
the commander, himself, has no intelligent plan ? 

The mistakes in fact, not to mention the numer- 
ous errors in principle, which were manifest to Porter 
during the 28th and 29th of August, were so numerous 
and so glaring, that they would have destroyed all con- 
fidence in Pope's judgment, even if Pope's ridiculous 
proclamation upon taking command, and the contra- 
dictory orders and futile marches for a week past, had 
not already shaken the faith of the whole army. 
First, was the urgent night summons to Bristoe, which 
proved useless, and which was a part of a false move- 
ment ; next, the order to march to Centerville, when 
Porter knew there was no enemy near there, and the 
route would take him far from his proper direction ; 
then, the information that, by Pope's orders. Gaines- 
ville had been abandoned, and the way was open for 
the junction of the rebel forces ; then, the countermand 
of the first order of the morning, which order was far 
advanced towards fulfillment, and the direction to 
Porter to retrace his steps for a considerable distance, 
and march towards Gainesville; then, the errors of fact 
and of judgment which were contained in the Joint 
Order. These were : 

First. The statement that the corps of Heintzel- 
man, Sigel and Reno were near Gainesville, about ten 
o'clock when the order was written, whereas Porter 
knew that those corps were not near Gainesville at 



46 

twelve o'clock, and, by reason of Longstreet's arrival, 
were not likely to be there at all. 

Second. The statement, in effect, that Longstreet's 
force would require from thirty to forty-eight hours to 
march fifteen miles, which Porter would have known 
was absurd, even if Longstreet had not then been 
actually before him. This was such an astounding error 
on the part of Pope, that it is unaccountable even to 
this day. 

The knowledge that four such mistakes were made 
in one morning (and more were to come in the after- 
noon), following two of the day before, was enough to 
puzzle any officer as to his present duty and the plans 
of his commander. It was impossible for him, with 
the best intentions, to know what would subserve the 
purposes of a commander, whose plans were formed 
with so little reference to existing facts. 

The reasons which induced McDowell to forego an 
attack with 25,000 men were all the more cogent, indeed 
were irresistible to Porter, when by McDowell's with- 
drawal, his force was reduced to 10,000 men or less. In 
his difficult position he could consider four courses of 
action : 

First. To attack the enemy in his front. 

Second. To make a flank march to the right in order 
to reach the other corps. 

Third. To retreat. 

Fottrth. To remain on the defensive where he was. 

We have seen the reasons which he had for not 
attacking. The woods concealed the enemy's force to 
a great extent, but Porter's previous knowledge of the 
presence of a large part, if not the whole, ot Long- 
street's corps, was confirmed during the afternoon, by 
frequent reports from officers on the skirmish line. 



47 

They saw large bodies of troops, and could hear their 
movements and the commands of officers. Lieutenant 
Stevenson estimated that he saw 12,000 to 15,000 men 
in the enemy's lines, and we know now that he was 
right. Colonel Marshall said that the enemy's force 
was double that of Porter's. He saw heavy columns 
moving into position. For Porter to have attacked 
without McDowell's co-operation, forces of the enemy 
presumably and actually superior in numbers to his 
own, and advantageously posted, ought to have resulted, 
and undoubtedly would have resulted, in overwhelming 
defeat. He might, perhaps, have made an attack to 
see what would come of it, but that would have been 
anticipating the dreadful errors of Fredericksburg, 
Spottsylvania Court-house and Cold Harbor. If he 
began the attack, he could not predict where it was 
likely to end, or whether or not he would be in a posi- 
tion to retire behind Bull Run that night, as his orders 
and the famished condition of his men alike dictated. 
To fight without communication, and so place himself 
that he could not retire behind Bull Run, when he had 
been ordered to halt with communication, so that he 
cou/d retire behind Bull Run, to fight there if anywhere, 
would have been as flagrant and criminal a violation of 
orders, as anything that has been alleged against him. 
That his judgment as to the inexpediency of an 
attack was correct, is confirmed by the concurrent 
opinions of the most distinguished rebel officers. 
General Lee says, in a letter to Porter, in 1867 : "The 
result of an attack before 12 m., with 25,000 men, 
cannot be certainly pronounced ; but it ought to have 
been repulsed if made after his (Longstreet's) troops 
were formed. The probable result of an attack on 



48 



Longstreet, after 12 u., with less than 12,000, would 
have been a repulse." And again, in 1870: "If a 
repulse, especially at an early hour, or before 5 p. m., 
the effect would have been an attack upon General 
Pope's left and rear by Longstreet and Stuart, which, 
if successful, would have resulted in the relief of 
Jackson, and have probably rendered unnecessary the 
battle of the next day" (August 30th), 

General Longstreet, in a letter to Porter, in 1866, 
says: "We all were particularly anxious to bring on 
the battle after 12 m., General Lee more so than 
the rest. If you had attacked any time after 12 m., 
it seems to me that we surely would have destroyed 
your army; — that is, if you had attacked with less than 
25,000 men." 

We have had considerable experience in attacking 
Lee in his chosen positions, and it has invariably illus- 
trated the maxims of Napoleon, " Not to do anything 
which your enemy wishes," "" '"' '" and, "Avoid 
a field of battle which he has reconnoitered and 
studied." 

General Hood writes to Porter in 1874, " ""' '"" "" 
An attack made by you, with about 11,000, it seems 
to me, would have been attended by a repulse, and 
perhaps great disaster, had time permitted it to have 
been followed up." 

General Wilcox, in 1870, writes: "I should think 
it almost certain, had you attacked at 1 1 a. m., with 
your command such as I supposed it to have been, 
you would have been repulsed. Had you attacked 
any time after 2 p. m., I have no doubt you would 
have been easily and thoroughly repulsed, and had it 
have been at or near two o'clock, you would have 



40 



been used up, and those on your right might have, 
and probably would have, been overwhelmed, too." 

General B. H. Robertson writes, in 1870, " "'■ '• 
'" "" I should say an attack with 25,000 men would 
have failed. After twelve o'clock and throughout the 
day, I believe an attack with 10,000 men would have 
been utterly disastrous to the Federal forces." 

At one time, late in the day, Porter actually began 
making preparations for an attack in aid of Sigel, and 
" that," the Board of Officers say, " was the nearest to 
making a mistake that Porter came that afternoon." 

We need no further authority for the conclusion 
that his decision not to attack the forces in his front 
was a wise one. What he had reason to believe, and 
did believe, at the time, we now prove to have been 
the truth. 

Porter could not make a flank march across the 
country to go to Pope's assistance or effect communi- 
cation with the other corps, because the distance was 
two miles, there were no roads, the ground was broken 
and rock)', very heavily timbered, abounding in hills 
and hollows and wooded ravines, intersected by many 
streams, and wholly imi)racticable for artillery. The 
only open country was along the front of the rebel 
lines, exposed to the full fire of their batteries, and 
attack by their troops. The moment Porter left his 
position to make the flank march, his column would be 
helplessly exposed to attack in flank and rear, which 
the rebel General Robertson says, would have been 
"perfectly ruinous." General Longstreet testifies that 
such a movement would have given his forces just the 
opportunit)- they were waiting for, "and we should 
have pushed it with all the vigor that was in us." 



50 



Napoleon says : " Nothing is more rash, or more 
opposed to the principles of war, than a flank march 
in presence of an army in position, especially when 
that army occupies heights, at the foot of which you 
must defile." 

Porter could not retire and take the Sudley Springs 
road which McDowell had taken, because that was 
filled with McDowell's troops, King's and Ricketts' 
divisions, 15,000 men, marching up all the afternoon. 
Besides, Porter's remaining in position was undoubt- 
edly what made that road safe for McDowell's march. 

Porter could not ret7'-eat entirely, in the face of a 
vigilant and numerous foe, for that would have been 
to invite destruction for himself and McDowell, as well 
as for the rest of Pope's army. Besides, he cannot be 
blamed for not retreating for it w^as one of the charo^es 
against him, that he did 7'etreat, and it was a capital 
offense, and the Court-martial found him guilty of it, 
although there was not a word of truth in it. It is 
difficult to see what they would have found if it had 
been really true ; but he saved them from that embar- 
rassment, by not retreating at all. 

He finally decided to remain where he w^as until 
he could receive further intelligence or instructions. 
He prepared for a plucky and obstinate defense in the 
strong position which he held. There he remained 
until the next morning, when he was ordered away by 
Pope. During the afternoon, he sent two written 
messages to Pope (neither of wdiich would Pope pro- 
duce), stating his situation ; and at least four such 
messages to McDowell or Pope, whichever could be 
first found ; but McDowell, not being where it was 
expected he would be, could not readily be found, and 
was finally reached when he was with Pope. 



51 

Porter could not have known that a severe action 
of great consequence was being fought, and that his 
aid was greatly needed, or believed that General 
Pope's troops were being defeated ; because there was 
no such action, and nothing to give rise to such a 
belief. There was no time in the afternoon, after 
Porter reached his position, when more than 5,000 
troops were engaged at once. With the exception 
of an attack by a brigade or two, there was nothing 
but cannonading, which the. army had heard all the 
way from the Rappahannock, to indicate that any 
enemy was in their vicinity. At the very time when, 
according to Pope's opinion. Porter ought to have 
attacked, Pope himself rode upon the field and stopped 
the fighting. It was not until nearly night, too late to 
effect anything, that any musketry firing was heard in 
Porter's position. 

Porter could not see the field of battle at the right, 
on account of the intervening woods and hills, nor 
could he hear anything but the artillery firing, which, 
as General Morell said, did not sound like a battle. 
Therefore Porter did not believe that Pope's army 
was being defeated, nor that the aid of his corps was 
greatly needed. 

There was no such thinor as a o-eneral eneatrement, 
or a " battle raging at the right," that day, despite 
Pope's assertion that he fought a " terrific battle with 
the couibiiied forces of the enemy, which lasted with 
continuous fury from daylight until after dark." Pope's 
attacks w^ere so weak and ill-supported that they could 
not possibly have been successful. General Schurz 
says in his report: "The troops were frittered away 
in isolated efforts." 



r^9. 



Porter could do little after McDowell left him, but 
what he did, was a service which Pope would never 
acknowledo-e, but for which he ouoht to have been 
profoundly grateful. Porter detained in his front the 
greater part of Longstreet's corps, to hold him in 
check ; and prevented the concentration upon Pope's 
left, which caused the defeat of the next day. We 
have General Lee's authority for saying that, but for 
Porter's presence, the terrible disaster which happened 
on the 30th of August would have occurred on the 
29th. If so, it would have been fatal to Pope's army, 
for night was all that saved the Federals on the 30th ; 
and the attack if made the day before, would have 
begun much earlier, and Pope would have been a 
day's march farther from his reenforcements. 

Chantilly would have been unnecessary, and Antie- 
tam perhaps impossible. 

But nothing could save Pope. The operations of 
his mind, and the disposition of his forces, were alike 
so faulty, that his defeat was merely a question of time. 

His ideas and, unfortunately, many of his state- 
ments were too little in harmony with the environ- 
ment. 

The Time of Longstreet's Arrival. 

The time of Longstreet's arrival upon the field, 
on the 29th of August, is now so conclusively settled, 
that it seems curious it should ever have been a 
matter of dispute. Yet all the enemies of Porter 
have strenuously denied that Longstreet's corps, or 
any large force of the enemy was before him that day; 
and Pope has defended that false position with all 
the heaviest artillery of misrepresentation. 



Porter claimed before the Court-martial, and proved 
the fact beyond a reasonable doubt to any body of men 
who were not seeking an excuse for condemning him, 
that the large part of the rebel army known as Long- 
street's corps, was confronting him. This question is 
the one upon which any estimate of Porter's conduct 
must chiefly depend. Porter had good reason at the 
time to believe that Longstreet was before him ; he 
did believe so, in common with all his officers who had 
opportunity for observation; McDowell believed so; 
every one who knew anything about it believed so, 
except Pope, and he professes not to believe it to this 
day. If Longstreet actually ivas present, then are 
both the judgment and conduct of Porter justified ; 
for in that case, all of Pope's plans and orders were so 
at variance with existing facts, that literal obedience 
was impossible, and discretion could rest only upon 
general military knowledge. 

The question is settled, 

First. By the probabilities of the case. 

Second. By direct and overwhelming testimony. 

T/ie Probabilities. 

We know, as Porter and Pope knew, that Lee, 
with Longstreet's corps, reached Thoroughfare Gap 
soon after noon of Auo'ust 28th. A part ot his force 
had passed the Gap, and was driven back by the 
advance of Ricketts. It may be supposed that Lee 
was anxious to reach Jackson, knowing that the small 
force of the latter was exposed to the whole Federal 
army. He took measures at once, to dislodge 
Ricketts, which he soon succeeded in doing. At least 



54 



three of his divisions encamped that night on the east 
side of the Gap. From the Gap to Gainesville is six 
miles and a half; from Gainesville to the extremity of 
Jackson's line, was about three miles, and from Gaines- 
ville to Dawkins Branch, where Porter stopped, was 
about three miles, with a good road all the way. 
Lee's line was about a mile in front of Porter, so that, 
from daylight, Lee would have about seven hours and 
a half in which to march eight miles and a half, and 
arrive at his position near Dawkins Branch, at the 
same time as Porter. At daylight was heard the 
engagement of Sigel's corps with Jackson, and it is 
certain that officers and men of Lee's force would not 
be slow in marching towards the sound of the cannon. 
With no reason for delay, and every reason for speed, 
it would be incredible if Lee did not reach his position 
in much less time than what we have allowed him. 
We know that he did arrive there in ample time, by 

Direct and OveriuJiclming Testimony . 

Longstreet says, in his report : " The march was 
quickened to the extent of our capacity." He testifies 
that they moved in the gray of the morning, about four 
o'clock. After hearing the artillery, they increased 
their speed to three miles an hour. General Wilcox 
started at sunrise from Hopewell Gap, and moved 
rapidly — "too rapidly." He reached the junction of 
the roads, and found Longtreet's troops going by. 
Major Williams, aid-de-camp to General Jones, testi- 
fies that they made the march " as rapidly as it could 
be made." General Buford saw what he estimated to 
be over 14,000 men {more than half of Longstreet's 
force then present), go through Gainesville, at a 



55 

quarter before nine o'clock. So much for the rapidity 
of the march. 

As to the time of arrival — besides the indirect evi- 
dence derived from the citations which we have given 
before in reference to an attack — General Lee says : 
" Longstreeet's command arrived within supporting 
distance of Jackson on 29th August, '62, between 9 
and 10 A. M. General Longstreet's command was 
formed by 12 m., August 29th, in two lines on Jackson's 
right." And again: " I was there then ; I saw Porter 
approach. I went out and reconnoitered his corps, and 
made proper dispositions to meet it." 

General Longstreet says : " My command (25,000 
in round numbers) was within supporting distance of 
General Jackson at 9 a. m., August 29th, having passed 
Thoroughfare Gap at early dawn. My command was 
deployed in double line for attack between 10 a, m. 
and 12 M. on the 2gth, extending from Jackson's 
right across turnpike and Manassas Gap R. R. My 
command was ready to receive any attack after 1 1 
o'clock A. M." He testifies before the Board of Officers : 
" I think they had been deployed by eleven o'clock in 
the day." 

In addition to that convincing testimony, we have 
the statements, either in reports, letters, or testimony, 
of the rebel Generals Robertson, D. R. Jones, Early, 
Hood, Wilcox, Colonel Marshall, aid -de-camp of 
General Lee. Major Williams, aid-de-camp of General 
Jones, and Lieutenant W. M. Owen, Adjutant of the 
Washington Artillery, all to the effect that the arrival 
and formation of Longstreet's corps occurred between 
10 and 12 o'clock that morning. General Beverly 
Robertson says: "My videttes had reported your 



56 



(Porter's) approach, and Longstrect's forces to meet 
yours were mainly posted before your arrival. Had 
you continued your march, or attacked at any time, 
you would have struck Longstreet's line of battle, over 
25,000 strong." 

It is idle to say that the fallibility of human memory 
discredits witnesses so intelligent, so numerous and so 
reputable, whose testimony is positive and harmonious. 
The event which those officers describe was one in 
which they personally took part ; it was of great impor- 
tance, and therefore likely to fix the attention ; the hour 
of noon is one which naturally attracts notice; the start 
from the Gap at sunrise, within hearing of the dis- 
tant cannonade, gave them a definite point from which 
to estimate time and distance; and further, the memory 
could be refreshed, if doubtful, by reference to their 
own contemporaneous orders, reports and memoranda. 
Buford saw half of Longstreet's force, before nine 
o'clock, -within three miles of the position afterwards 
taken by Porter. Why should not that half have 
arrived within one mile of that position by half-past 
eleven, and why should not that part have been fol- 
lowed by the rest ? We know with all the certainty 
which can exist in human affairs, that Longstreet's force 
was present just as Porter believed and alleged that 
it was. 

It is absurd to attempt to combat such evidence, 
by other evidence equally depending upon the fallibil- 
ity of memory, and based upon Stuart's vainglorious 
report, or any other work of fiction. Stuart's report 
was written six months after the events it erroneously 
describes. P'rom that report, one would judge Stuart's 
movements to have been very important ; whereas in 



57 

fact, his whole conduct on the field was that of a busy- 
body. He did little useful service; but by ordering 
troops away from places where they were needed, and 
into places where they were not needed, he nearly 
marred the plans of his superiors. He and Rosser 
may have amused themselves by ordering their com- 
mand to tie brush to their horses' tails, and drag it 
along the road in order to raise a dust — as a story, 
"that is magnificent, but it is not war" — but whether 
they did so or not, they did not deceive anybody, for 
Longstreet was there, and there was nothing for any- 
body to be deceived about. Other enemies of Porter, 
with less candor in the avowal and more harm in the 
result, have been ever since " raisino^ a dust" to con- 
ceal the true time of Lonorstreet's arrival. 

But as they are consciously weak in their theory 
of time, they endeavor to bolster their hopeless cause 
by another theory in respect to place. They plead a 
confession and avoidance. They maintain, that even 
if Longstreet did arrive anywhere near the time when 
he thinks he did, his troops were not placed where he 
and Lee and other prominent officers think they were. 
They try to prove by the testimony of citizens and 
chaplains, that the rebel lines were west of Page Land 
Lane, a mile or more back of their actual position. 
That when those lines were arranged by Lee in 
person, with special reference to Porter's presence, 
they were not placed where they could do Porter any 
harm, or interfere at all with his movements. We 
have neither time nor space in which to argue against 
such "preposterous conclusions." Nor is it necessary. 
Lee with Longstreet was in Porter's front, whether 
near this or that citizen's house, is not material ; he 



58 

reached his position before Porter came up ; he had 
the choice of the country, and doubtless took the 
position he wanted to take ; he arranged his h'nes in 
person, with special reference to Porter. I have 
sufficient faith in Lee's military judgment, to believe, 
that the position chosen was the most commanding 
and best for all purposes, which the vicinity afforded; 
that when Lee saw Porter approach, and disposed his 
troops to meet him, those troops were placed where 
they would be most effective. 

Lee, Longstreet and others identify on maps the 
place where they were, and describe the formation of 
their lines. Their opinions substantially agree with 
Porter's. Colonel Marshall, Lee's aid-de-camp, found 
and identified the position of the troops he visited, and 
the tree which he climbed near Lee's head-quarters ; 
and if Lee's statement of the position of his line is not 
correct, and Marshall is worthy of belief, Lee's head- 
quarters must have been far in advance of his first line. 

General Lee personally arranged his lines ; and 
when he says that he saw Porter approach, and made 
dispositions to meet him, I believe it ; and I should 
believe that Lee knew what he saw, and knew where 
his troops were placed, and that they were most 
advantageously posted, if all the citizens in the county 
and all the chaplains in the Confederacy should gain- 
say it. Besides, we know where Porter was, and we 
know from the testimony of his officers, that the woods 
in front of them were full of hostile skirmishers ; and 
large bodies of troops, estimated at from 12,000 to 
15,000, were seen on the hills beyond. Heroic men 
crawled towards the rebel lines, where discovery was 



59 



death, and heard the movement of troops, and the 
commands of officers. 

We have seen that Porter had orood reason to 
believe that Longstreet was before him in strong 
force ; he did beheve so, and it was the truth. The 
contingency was not provided for by his orders. He 
was in a difficult and dangerous situation, and had 
nothing to guide him but his own judgment and mili- 
tar}^ knowledge. These he used, as we now know, 
loyally and wisely. He remained on the defensive 
durine the afternoon, with little molestation. His 
conduct thus far was neither " disobedient " nor 
" shameful." 

But at night a new difficulty arose from the receipt 
of what is known as 

The "4.30 p. M. Order." 

The order reads as follows : 

Head-quarters in the Field, 

August 29, 1862 (4.30 p. M.) 

Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's 
right flank. I desire you to push forward into action 
at once on the enemy's flank, and it possible, on his 
rear, keeping your right in communication with Gen- 
eral Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods 
in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you 
engage their flank Keep heavy reserves, and use 
your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all 
the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so 
to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close 
communication with the right wing. 

JoH\ I'opi:, 
Major-General commanding. 

Major-General Porter. 



60 



This order, even if it had been possible of execu- 
tion at all, was not delivered to Porter until sundown, 
too late to execute it. Five witnesses of unimpeach- 
able character, before the Court-martial, swore posi- 
tively to this fact. The Court chose to believe the 
conjectures of Douglas Pope, in preference to the 
convincing testimony of the opposing witnesses. I 
will not characterize Captain Pope's testimony, or that 
of his orderly. It bears its refutation upon its face, 
and subsequent disclosures in the record, conclusively 
establish its character. 

The flank and rear which Pope intended should 
be attacked, were of course Jackson's. But therein 
he added another to the many errors of that day. 
Porter's line of march did not bring him in upon the 
enemy's flank, either right or left. It brought him 
directly upon Longstreet's front, where 25,000 men 
were ready to receive him. Jackson's flank was 
three miles away from him, across an impracticable 
country, and the only way to reach it would have 
been either by a flank march along the whole length 
of Longstreet's line, or by the defeat of his over- 
whelming forces. This at sunset, with 10,000 men 
against 25,000, would have been a sufficiently serious 
undertaking. 

The next mistake on the part of Pope, was the 
direction to Porter to keep his right in communication 
with Reynolds. The latter was at least two miles 
from Porter, with the same impassable country between 
them. Porter could not connect with Reynolds, and 
there was no flank or rear of any enemy that could be 
attacked. Longstreet outflanked Porter, and Jackson 
was too far off and too well defended. 



Gl 

On this point General Lee says : " Porter could 
not take Jackson in flank while he was attacked in 
front. He could do nothing- of that sort. '" '''" '" ^'' 
We flanked him. He could not flank Jackson, I 
suppose we should have cut Porter to pieces if he had 
attacked to get at J ackson s flanks 

Porter was convicted for not attacking in front, 
under an order to attack in flank. The order was not 
received in time for any thing ; but because the Court 
erroneously supposed that it was received in time to 
attack the enemy directly in front, it therefore con- 
cluded that Porter was guilty for not attacking an 
enemy three miles away in flank. By such contradic- 
tions did the Court seek to appease popular passion, 
and propitiate the Powers that be. 

To have reached Jackson's flank as intended by the 
order, and prepared for action, would have required at 
least two hours, even if no enemy had been opposing. 
The whole order was a mistake, and Porter knew it 
then, as well as we know it now. 

However, late as it was, he sent to Morell the 
order to attack, and himself rode to the front to direct 
the movement. All the officers there, who had been 
watching the enemy during the whole afternoon, Morell 
included, remonstrated against the attack. Even that 
gallant veteran, Colonel Marshall, who had risked his 
life that day by crawling close up to the rebel pickets, 
who was wounded almost to death at Fredericksburg, 
who never flinched from an enemy whom he could 
see ; even he, said that it would be certain destruc- 
tion to attack, and he did not wish to go into that 
timber. 



(j'l 



In view of all these circumstances, Porter very 
properly recalled the order. To have done otherwise 
would have been little better than useless murder. He 
would not have been justified in attacking even by 
daylight, with the knowledge that he had, which he 
knew his commander had not. The order was based 
upon premises wholly false. Pope still labored under 
the hallucination, which lasted far into the following 
day, that he was fighting Jackson alone, and that Jack- 
son was anxious to retreat. Hence all his dispositions 
were erroneous. 

The situation on the 29th of August may be repre- 
sented approximately thus : 

What Pope assumed it to be — '" 

ACKSON, 22,000 men. 




PoPK, 33,000 men. 

What it actually was — 






^^S^ 



^'C.SOJV 




^ej,. 



It will be seen at a glance how erroneous Pope's 
ideas were, how difficult was Porter's position, and how 
impossible of execution was the "4.30 Order." 



* Note to Second Edition. — General Grant has publicly given 
me credit for the assistance afforded by this work, in the preparation 
of his article in the No7-th A/neruafi Review for December, 1882. 



63 

It has been held by Pope and by the Judge- Advo- 
cate of the Court-martial, that Porter should have 
attacked whatever force was in his front : — Pope says : 
" Whether there were 5,000 or 50,000 of the enemy ;" 
even if " the whole Southern Confederacy was in front 
of him." And this, to obey an order to attack in flank 
and rear a supposed small detachment already outnum- 
bered ! This proposition is hardly worthy of discuss- 
ion. But for fear some one may be misled by it, I 
will give it a moment's consideration. Napoleon's 
maxim already quoted in regard to passive obedience, 
is the best guide in forming our judgment. 

Where an officer receives an order from his com- 
mander who is personally present and cognizant of the 
situation, it is undoubtedly his duty to obey, however 
dangerous or even reckless or mistaken the undertaking 
may appear to him ; for he cannot know but it may be a 
part of a general plan which requires his sacrifice for 
some great and compensating advantage. The same is 
true when the subordinate is at a distance, and the com- 
mander eives the order, with a full knowledcre of the cir- 
cumstances, or repeats it after he has received informa- 
tion of them. This last was the case with Hooker at 
Fredericksburg, and Porter on the 30th of August. 
Hooker was ordered by Burnside to make an attack 
which was ill-judged and hopeless. He left his com- 
mand, sought Burnside, and remonstrated against such 
a desperate movement. The order was repeated, and 
Hooker attacked. He says with grim humor, in speak- 
ing of the result: " Finding that I had lost as many 
men as my orders required me to lose, I suspended 
the attack." 

On the 30th of August, Pope believed the enemy 
were in retreat. Porter and the other officers at the 



64 



front knew better. They recaptured a Union soldier 
who confirmed the report of a retreat. Porter sent 
him to Pope, remarking that he beheved either that 
the soldier was a fool, or that he was released on pur- 
pose to create a wrong impression. The message came 
back : " General Pope believes that soldier, and directs 
you to attack." And Porter did attack splendidly, and 
was repulsed, and lost quite as many men as his ordei^s 
required him to lose. Wherever it was possible for Pope 
to make a mistake he made one. 

When it was Porters duty to obey, he did not 
hesitate; but under the 4.30 Order there was no duty 
which he could fulfill. The order required an impos- 
sibility, and based the requirement upon two vital 
errors. It showed on its face that Pope had no accu- 
rate knowledge of the situation — that he was hopelessly 
mistaken. To declare that Porter should have use- 
lessly sacrificed men under such circumstances, is 
simply monstrous. 

Porter withdrew his forces as ordered, early in the 
morning of the 30th, and rejoined Pope near Groveton. 
We shall presently see whether his action on that day 
was disobedient or shameful. 

The Animus. 

An attempt was made to prejudice the mind of the 
Court-martial, and subsequently that of the President, 
by means which seem to the writer wholly unfair and 
improper. When Porter left General Burnside's com- 
mand to join Pope, Burnside requested him to send 
information from time to time, of affairs at the front. 
This Porter did in a series of dispatches designed 



65 



merely for Burnside's personal perusal. The dis- 
patches were mainly an account of military movements, 
and in that respect were unobjectionable. But there 
was an occasional sentence, written with the freedom 
which one friend would use in writing- to another, 
which referred somewhat disrespectfully to Pope and 
his strategy. Here are the worst of those allusions : 

" The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the 
inverse proportion," 

" It would seem from proper statements of the 
enemy, that he was wandering around loose ; but I 
expect they know what they are doing, which is more 
than any one here or any where knows." 

"All that talk about bagging Jackson, etc., was 
bosh. That enormous gap, Manassas, was left open, 
and the enemy jumped through ; and the story of 
McDowell having cut off Longstreet, had no good 
foundation. '" '" '" I expect the next thing will be 
a raid on our rear by Longstreet who was cut off" 

Those passages certainly do not indicate any great 
depth of depravity. Burnside testified that he saw no 
harm in the dispatches, and he sent them to the Presi- 
dent. Mr. Lincoln saw no harm in them, or if he did, 
he made himself a party to their wickedness, for he 
expressed himself as glad to get them, and personally 
thanked Porter for them, on the battle-field of Antietani. 
He said they gave him the only true account of events 
that he could o-et at the time. 

But when the prosecution could not make out a case 
against Porter by the evidence of his acts, they sought 
to eke out their scanty proof by alleged evidence of his 
thoughts. They used these dispatches, as Judge- Advo- 
cate Holt avowed, for the purpose of " determining 



66 



points otherwise left doubtful by the evidence.'" In other 
words, when it could not be shown from the evidence, 
that Porter's acts were wrong, it was sought to prove 
that they must be so, because his thoughts were wrong. 
An erroneous idea of what he would be likely to do, 
was used as evidence to prove what he did. To such 
a ridiculous extent was this method carried, that 
Lieutenant-Colonel T, C. H. Smith testified that he 
had never seen Porter before, but from his manner and 
tone, he (Smith) knew Porter would fail Pope. Smith 
was the great mind-reader for the prosecution. He 
further says that, but for fear of the law, he would 
have murdered Porter at that time, merely on account 
of his looks ! That is some of the testimony by which 
Porter was convicted. 

The attempt was made to prove that Porter's 
animus towards Pope was evil, therefore his whole 
conduct would be evil. Acts which would have been 
considered innocent and unavoidable in the case of 
another, were distorted into high crimes in the case 
of Porter, because forsooth, he did not speak reverently 
of Pope's ridiculous proclamation and futile strategy 
Such a course of proceeding was wholly wrong both in 
principle and in fact. In principle, because, when the 
acts which a man did are the subject of inquiry, they 
cannot be proved by showing what he might be thought 
likely to do. It would be as reasonable to convict a 
man of murder because he hated his enemy, and 
therefore might be thought likely to wish him dead, 
when the sole question was — -and it was a point left 
doubtful by the evidence — whether that enemy had 
been killed by anybody, or was dead at all. 



67 

The questions which the Court was investigating 
were, not what did Porter think, and what action would 
such thoughts be hkely to lead to ; but, first, what did 
he do ? and second, was that action reasonable and 
right under the circumstances ? His opinion of Pope, 
or his feelings towards Pope, have nothing to do with 
the case, until it is not left doubtful by the evidence 
that he failed in his duty. No one pretends that he 
served Pope from love of him — few officers did. The 
sole question is, did he dutifully serve him ? Did he 
fulfill his orders as it was reasonable to understand 
them, and as far as it was possible to execute them ? 
If it is not evident that he did so, then I have not 
adequately set forth the true conclusions from the 
record. If he did so, then his motives or his thoughts 
are of no consequence. 

The method of proof was wrong in fact, because 
the dispatches were represented to mean what they did 
not mean. 

They do not express any wish for Pope to fail, 
much less any intention to betray him. They indicate 
Si/ear that he will fail ; and that fear was abundantly 
warranted by the facts, and completely vindicated by 
the result. The whole trouble with the dispatches 
was, not that they were false, but that they were true. 
No intention to fail Pope can be properly inferred 
from them, even if they show contempt for him and 
his strategy. The case is very different from that of 
a quarrel between private persons, where only per- 
sonal feelings and personal interests are involved. In 
this case great national interests were at stake, and 
far more important considerations than personal spite, 
would influence Porter's conduct. For Porter to fail 



68 



Pope meant more than to gratify a personal resent- 
ment. It meant to fail in conduct as a soldier ; to 
forfeit the reputation of a lifetime of duty and of bril- 
liant success; to give up the hope of future distinction 
and advancement. It meant to inhumanly sacrifice 
the lives of men, for whose welfare he was almost 
unduly solicitous ; and finally, to imperil the safety 
of the Capital, and the existence of the nation for 
whose well-being he had received wounds in one war, 
and risked death in two. All this was the evident 
effect of failing Pope. Can it be supposed that Porter 
would risk all this, because he playfully reflected upon 
Pope's ridiculous strategy ? Can it be supposed that, 
in consequence of a petty spite, for the remote chance 
of ruining Pope, he would endanger the Capital and 
take the imminent chance of ruining his country } 
And this, too, with the certainty that his honor, if not 
his life, would pay the penalty ? There are many 
higher motives than love for Pope to induce an officer 
to do his duty, even under Pope's command. There- 
fore I say, that, until it is proved that Porter was out 
and out a traitor to his country, and lost to all sense 
not only of humanity but of self-interest, it cannot be 
argued that contempt for Pope would lead to a failure 
of duty under Pope. For this reason the use of 
expressions derogatory to Pope was improper for the 
purpose of proving acts hostile to the nation. It is 
preposterous to argue anything as to Porter's acts, 
from his dislike of Pope, until it is shown that all good 
motives and all self-interest were absent ; or else that 
love for Pope is the highest and most potent influence 
that can "spring eternal in the human breast." 

And further, we have no right to argue as to any 
motive to explain Porter's acts, until we prove beyond 



69 

a reasonable doubt that his acts were so faulty as to 
require such explanation. Not till then does the 
question of animus arise, to determine whether those 
acts were the result of willfulness or weakness. If 
what was required of him was impossible or unreason- 
able, what he thought of Pope does not affect the 
character of the requirement, or the action which 
should have been taken under the circumstances. 
Therefore, it was not proper to supplement the proof 
of points left doubtful by the evidence, by dispatches 
which could not in any way prove the facts claimed to 
be proved by them, even if they showed the animus 
claimed to be shown by them. 

But the so-called evidence of animus availed to 
bridge all the gaps between the allegations and the 
proof. It was an operation of Porter's mind that 
could make possible a march in three hours, which 
was impossible in six ; that could make the fact of a 
retreat, when there was no retreat ; that could make a 
battle of great consequence, when there was no such 
battle ; that could make an order to fight out of an 
order to retire ; that could cause an order to be deliv- 
ered at five o'clock, which was not delivered until 
seven ; that could make Longstreet absent, when he 
was present ; that could make possible an attack upon 
Jackson's flank, when the only possibility was an attack 
upon Longstreet's front ; that could have insured the 
capture of Jackson's army, when Jackson ran no risk 
of capture. It is claiming a good deal to say, even 
from the evidence for the prosecution, that these 
points attained the respectability of being doubtful. 
Yet Porter's animus supplied all deficiencies. Other 
officers mieht be lonfjer on the march, under fewer 



70 



difficulties than those which Porter overcame. Their 
conduct was energetic and exemplary. But it was 
Porter's animus that detained him, not the darkness 
nor the 2,000 wagons. 

After all Porter's action, his '' shameful disobedi- 
ence " and "cowardice," and even the dreadful animus 
of these dispatches, were known to the Government, 
they still had so much faith in his capacity and integ- 
rity that they put him in command of 25,000 men, for 
the defense of the Capital which he had so " willfully " 
and " shamefully " endangered. 

Pope himself, when he knew all about Porter's 
acts, told him that he was satisfied with them, except 
in one trivial and unimportant particular. But that 
was before he was aware of the animus. When he saw 
the criticisms upon his strategy, Ids ''eyes were opened^ 
Then he saw how heinous had been the conduct which 
he had before, with full knowledge, approved. He 
forthwith commenced that series of " indefensible and 
indecent" proceedings which culminated in the Court- 
martial. 

Errors of the Court-martial. 

The Court-martial which convicted Porter, has 
been very tenderly dealt with in the record of the 
Board of Officers ; that is, if complete reversal of its 
opinions, and the exhibition of numerous errors which 
it committed, are consistent with tender treatment. 
The Board very truly say : " These charges and speci- 
fications certainly bear no discernible resemblance to 
the facts of the case as now established." 

But in a critical study of the evidence presented to 
the Court, it is difficult to see how, with honesty and 



71 

intelligence, it could have made so many mistakes. 
It is to be regretted that the oath of secrecy prevents 
the disclosure of the vote by which its conclusions 
were reached. But for that, we might discriminate 
between the majority and the minority, if there was 
any such division. However, I should suppose that 
a member of the minority would be willing to bear his 
share of the odium, for the privilege of having cast his 
vote in protest against so great a wrong. 

The Court derives no authority from its person- 
ality. It consisted of nine officers of high rank, it is 
true ; but rank affords no sanction where acts are con- 
trary to justice and common sense. " By their fruits 
ye shall know them," not by their rank. Besides, we 
have as much right to argue that the decision was 
reached by a bare majority, and was therefore virtually 
the opinion of one man, as an opponent would have to 
claim the authority of nine men. 

In reviewing the testimony, it is impossible to under- 
stand the system upon which the Court estimated the 
credibility of witnesses, or the value of evidence. It 
seems as if every conjecture for the prosecution, by 
whomsoever advanced, outweicfhed everv fact for the 
defense. The verdict was certainly not fairly derived 
from the evidence, and in some instances, as that of a 
retreat, was not derived from the evidence at all. It 
is necessary to look for some influence outside of the 
case to account for such strained conclusions. We need 
not seek for a cause beyond the wild passions of the 
time, the popular belief that treason was rife and an 
example must be made, the clamor of the multitude, the 
same unthinking ferocity that, with the cry, " Crucify 
him, crucify him ! " led even a Roman governor to 
deliver to the sacrifice an innocent victim. 



72 



But, besides this cause, there was, perhaps, a specific 
reason for the action of the Court-martial. That was 
the great desire, if not the great need of the Admin- 
istration to secure a conviction. 

General McClellan had been set aside by Stanton 
and Halleck, who were personally and politically hos- 
tile to him. General Pope was put in his place, and 
held out as the champion who was to show the world 
how wrone McClellan had been, and how wise was the 
cabal which had overthrown him. Pope had begun his 
campaign in the character of Bombastes Furioso. He 
had issued a proclamation which has ever since been 
a source of shame to his friends, and delight to his 
enemies. The purposes of this proclamation were to 
fire the popular heart, and reflect upon McClellan. 
Therefore, when on the 2d of September, after Pope's 
dismal failure, the cabal was obliged to call McClellan 
again to the command, in order to save the Capital and 
the nation, the Administration was placed in an awkward 
and humiliating position. Something must be done to 
restore the reputation of the Government which had 
made such a grievous and ridiculous blunder as that 
which the appointment of Pope proved to be. The next 
elections might be fatal to the party in power, unless its 
agents could shift from themselves the responsibility 
for the late disasters. How could that be done better 
than by showing that Pope's defeat was due not to 
the incompetence of Pope himself, but to the negli- 
oence and insubordination of his officers ^ And how 
could a more conspicuous example be made than by 
selecting Fitz-John Porter as the victim? His con- 
viction would exonerate Pope, save the Administration, 
punish McClellan Indirectly, and terrify McClellan's 



73 



other friends. It was a large stake to play for, and it 
was won. 

The members of the Court were appointed by 
General Halleck, one of the cabal, instead of by the 
good President, who was often the dupe of the cabal. 
If the Court did not do the bidding of its masters, 
then there is no intelliirible reason for its false findingrs. 
Then the promotions of Judges and witnesses for the 
prosecution, which followed almost immediately after 
the conviction of Porter, are the most remarkable 
coincidences in history. If those promotions were not 
a return for value received from the verdict of the 
Court, the time when they were given indicates exceed- 
ingly bad taste on the part of the authorities. 

Let us summarize the serious errors of the Court. 

In respect to the events of the 29th of August, it 
decided against Porter, contrary not only to the pre- 
ponderance of evidence, but contrary to all the com- 
petent and credible evidence upon every point. The 
conviction was principally based upon the testimony of 
four witnesses who confessedly swore only upon con- 
jecture, as against the incontrovertible testimony of 
many witnesses who swore positively as to facts within 
their own knowledge. 

The Court committed great error in regard, 

1. To the position of Porter. 

2. To the numbers and position of the enemy. 

3. To the significance of the Joint Order. 

4. To the time of the receipt of the "4.30 Order." 

5. To the attack upon Jackson's flank and rear. 

6. To the battle raging at the right. 

7. To the retreat. 



74 

No witness for the prosecution pretended to have 
any ground but guess-work, upon which to base his 
idea of where Porter was, or where the enemy was. 
Even McDowell, who was with Porter for a time, 
placed him a mile in advance of his real position ; and 
before the Board of Officers admitted his error. The 
other witnesses knew nothing of where he was, but 
supposed him to be about the place indicated by Mc- 
Dowell. The maps before the Court were wholly wrong. 

2d. The Court ignored the presence of Longstreet, 
and even the significance of Buford's dispatch, and 
Buford's positive testimony as to what he actually saw. 

3d. The Joint Order was interpreted as an order 
to fight, when it was really and order to halt and retire. 
This error doubtless arose from the supposed order by 
McDowell to fight, which impression was also an error. 

4th. The error regarding the time of delivery of 
the "4.30 Order," arose from the worthless testimony 
of Captain Pope and his orderly ; testimony which 
would not have received credit in a Police Court, in a 
case which involved the penalty of one dollar. Their 
testimony was conjectural, and they were directly con- 
tradicted by five unimpeachable witnesses. The admis- 
sions afterwards made by Captain Pope, in moments 
of confidence or weakness, that he lost his way, and 
did not arrive till late, sufficiently show the value of 
his testimony. 

Before the Board of Officers, Major Randol corrob- 
orated the testimony of the five witnesses before the 
Court-martial, as to the arrival of Captain Pope about 
dark. Further, the intrinsic evidence of dispatches 



produced before the Board shows that Captain Pope 
did not arrive with the 4.30 Order within an hour 
at least of the time when he swore he did. The 
members of the Court-martial ought never to have 
believed him at all. In that case they would have had 
fewer errors to repent of now. 

Because the Court erroneously believed that the 
order was received in time to attack the enemy whom 
Porter claimed to be in front, they wrongly assumed 
that it was received in time for an attack upon Jackson's 
flank, three miles away. 

5th. Ignoring the presence of Longstreet, and 
putting Porter a mile ahead of his true position, with 
no enemy in his front, produced the error in regard to 
the possibility of an attack upon Jackson's flank and 
rear ; and because Porter did not attack overwhelming 
forces in front, the Court convicted him of not attack- 
ing weak forces in flank. 

6th. The battle raging at the right was a myth 
and a sham. As we have seen, there was no such 
battle, and no severe action of great consequence 
requiring Porter's aid, at any time after Porter reached 
his position. Pope, without Porter, outnumbered 
Jackson, if Longstreet was not there, by fully 10,000 
men, before McDowell's arrival on the field, and after- 
wards by 25,000. This shows the absurdity of the pre- 
tense that Porter's aid was needed, because Pope was 
fighting "greatly superior numbers." He was scarcely 
fiehtine at all, and the numbers were far inferior, unless 
Longstreet was present, as Porter claimed. 

Another absurdity closely connected with this, is the 
statement that Jackson's capture would have resulted if 



76 

Porter had done his dut}-. We can readily estimate the 
chances of Jackson's capture, under the bagging pro- 
cess as practiced by Pope. Jackson had been within 
five miles of Pope for nearly two days, and the latter 
knew no more of actual truth about him, than if he had 
been living in another planet. It was Pope's good 
luck, or rather the stubborn fighting of his troops, that 
alone prevented Jackson from capturing him. 

7th. The Court found the fact of a shameful 
retreat, when there was no retreat whatever, and no 
evidence of any ; and when in fact the evidence was 
positive that there was no retreat. 

I think these errors are sufficient to invalidate the 
judgment of any court, no matter how respectable its 
members, or how high their rank. Most of the errors 
could easily have been avoided, and ought to have been 
avoided, when it is considered that in order to con- 
vict, guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
There was no one of the accusations against Porter, in 
respect to which his innocence was not proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. We cannot escape the conclusion 
that the Court-martial was organized to convict, and 
its proceedings were a mockery of justice. 

Many of the rulings of the Court were grossly 
erroneous and unfair. They were so consistently, so 
monotonously against the accused, that they would 
really be amusing if their consequences had not been 
so serious. 

The composition of the Court was not favorable to 
an impartial hearing. The law requires that where a 
commander of an army prefers charges against an offi- 
cer under his command, the Court shall be convened 



77 

by the President. Pope first made the charges against 
Porter before a mihtary commission. This being too 
manifestly illegal, the commission was dissolved, and 
this Court-martial was convened by General Halleck. 
Then the technicality was resorted to, of having the 
charges made by an officer of Pope's staff, instead of 
Pope himself. The law was not designed to permit 
any such miserable subterfuge as that, especially in a 
capital case. When it suited Pope's purposes to deny 
having anything to do with the charges, he did so; but 
at other times he clainied the merit of them, and con- 
fessed that he had asked the President for his reward. 

Porter protested against the mode of convening 
the Court, but it is true he did not protest against any 
of the members : 

I St. Because he felt so confident of the merits of 
his defense, that he thought it could not fail before 
any court. 

2d. Because the order which convened the Court, 
told him, that "no other officers than these named, can 
be assembled without manifest injury to the service." 

He had, therefore, no choice but to accept the 
Court as it was, and he would have been most unwise 
to have made complaint. 

The Court should have consisted of thirteen mem- 
bers instead of nine, and the rank of all should have 
been as high as that of the defendant ; whereas only 
two were of the proper rank. Despite General Hal- 
leck's certification that " no other officers than these 
named can be assembled without manifest injury to 
the service," he actually made one substitution, and 
offered to make another. In fact, he could have found 



a full complement of officers, in numbers at least, if 
not in rank. Halleck's statement was merely another 
subterfuge, in order to get a court which would pro- 
duce the desired result. 

But we can afford to waive all narrow and technical 
considerations, and rest our unqualified condemnation 
of the Court-martial, upon the broad ground of its 
arbitrary and prejudiced proceedings, its erroneous 
inventions, and its inexcusably false conclusions. 

Two members of the Court, Generals King and 
Ricketts, were concerned in the very movements which 
were in question, and both had made a retreat which 
has been mildly characterized as " uncalled for and 
unmilitary."'" It would be supposed, considering the 
consequences of their retreat, that their conduct would 
have been inquired into before that of Porter. It was 
liable to inquiry at any time, unless some other victim 
should satisfy Pope, the Administration and the public. 
I do not allege that those officers were influenced by 
that consideration, and for all we know they may have 
voted in Porter's favor; but, being human, although 
both were estimable men, they were not proper judges 
in Porter's case. One of them, King, descended from 
the bench to contradict an important witness for the 
defense, and then returned to his seat, presumably to 
estimate the value of the testimony ; and that, too, 
when the accused person was on trial for his life. 

The sentence imposed by the Court-martial was 
not commensurate with the offense. Porter was con- 
demned " to be cashiered, and to be forever disquali- 
fied from holding any office of trust or profit under 

*John C. Ropes. "The Army under Pope," page 8i. 



79 

the Government of the United States." That \va; 
an infliction sufficiently severe, when apphed to ai 
innocent man ; but if Porter was guilty, as the Cour 
declared, he ought certainly to have been shot o 
hung. A milder sentence for such heinous crimes 
shows either that the decision was reached by a ban 
majority of the Judges, not enough for a death sen 
tence, or else, that they were distrustful of their owi 
verdict. There was certainly no mercy to be expectec 
from them. While depriving Porter of reputation 
rank and pay, they spared his life, as I believe, no 
from mercy, but from, perhaps, a consciousness, tha 
if he were ever vindicated, as he has recently been, 
judicial robbery would be less awkward for all con 
cerned than a judicial murder. 

Lincoln's Approval. 

We come now to the saddest part of this who! 
sad business, that which relates to President Lincoln' 
action. Lincoln was too just to have approved ths 
sentence, if he had known the true character of th 
evidence. Not having time to read the voluminou 
reports of the trial, he requested Judge-Advocatt 
General Holt " to revise the proceedings of the Courl 
martial, '" '" "' and to report fully upon any lege 
questions that may have arisen in them, and upon th 
bearing of the testimony in reference to the charges an 
specifications exhibited against the accused, and upo 
which he was tried." 

Lincoln wanted a full and fair statement of the cas( 
Holt did not neglect his opportunity. He had decline 
to areue the case before the Court-martial ; but, befor 
Mr. Lincoln, the defense could make no reply. H 



80 



Dresented a review which pretended to be such as the 
President had asked for, but which, in reahty, was an 
irgument by an advocate for the prosecution, and a 
/ery unfair, mean and bitter argument at that. Mr. 
Lincoln fell into the trap, and, relying upon Holt's 
itatements, approved the sentence of the Court. The 
^[■reat-hearted, just-minded, and confiding President was 
lo match for the subtle and malicious schemers by 
vhom he was surrounded. It is not too much to say 
hat Lincoln's approval of that sentence was obtained 
)y willfully false pretenses. 

Mr. Lincoln probably continued to the day of his 
leath in the belief that Porter had disgracefully re- 
reated. The testimony before the Board of Officers 
)f the President's son, Mr. Robert T. Lincoln, gives us 
';ood reason for believing that this one so-called fact 
)f a retreat, which was really the only /acl that had not 
. particle of evidence, good or bad, to sustain it, was a 
)otent cause, if not the chief cause, of the President's 
pproval. 

The President afterwards expressed his willingness 
o give the case a rehearing, and his hope tor Porter's 
indication. He met his traoric death before Porter's 
ppeal was fully prepared. The great and good Lin- 
oln, had he lived and learned the truth, would have 
>een swift to undo the cruel injustice which he had 
>een deceived into doing, and to rebuke the wicked- 
less which led to it. 

Porter's Conduct, August 30TH. 

No estimate of Porter's conduct is complete with- 
lut a consideration of his services on the 30th of 
Vugust, the day following his alleged shameful behavior. 



81 



His motives all through these events were called 
in question before the Court-martial, and he was 
not allowed to introduce evidence of his conduct on 
the 30th, to show the falsehood of the accusation. 
There was an additional specification under the second 
general charcre, allesfinor Porter's misconduct and feeble- 
ness in attack on that day. Now it happened that his 
action was particularly gallant and efficient that day, 
and he could prove it so. Such proof would go far to 
refute the charge of indifference and insubordination, 
that is, the evil animus, on which the Government 
especially relied to make out its case. The Judge- 
Advocate promptly dismissed the accusation, at the 
opening of the Court ; and consequently the accused 
was not permitted to introduce evidence of his good 
conduct on that day, to offset the alleged proofs of evil 
intent derived from previous days. If that result was 
in contemplation of the Judge- Advocate when he 
dismissed the accusation, such action, even in so emi- 
nent a politician as Colonel Holt, was but little above 
a very low degree of pettifogging. 

It is not credible that an officer whose whole life 
had been brilliant and honorable, should be a poltroor 
one day and a hero the next, simply because he die 
not like General Pope. Such an emotion would noi 
produce conduct so eccentric. 

Porter's noble service on the 30th of August, ha^ 
been appropriated by Pope to himself on the 29th 
The latter published Jackson's report of operation: 
on the 30th, which included Porter's attack, under th( 
representation that it applied to the attacks of th( 
29th, under Pope's direction. In other words, by ; 
transposition of dates, he used Porter's own gallantry 



82 



and energy, to which his antagonist bore witness, as a 
means of proving Porter guilty of cowardice and inef- 
ficiency. Pope's attention has often been called to the 
error, but I have not heard that he has yet endeavored 
to correct it. 

On the afternoon of the 30th of August, Porter's 
command led the hopeless and ill-judged attack upon 
Jackson's lines. The assault was described by rebel 
Dfficers, as "determined and most obstinate." Jackson 
said it was impetuous and well sustained ; it engaged 
lis entire line in a fierce and sancryinarv struijofle, and 
io "severely pressed" him, that he sent to Lee for 
"eenforcements. Porter's command lost over 2,100 
Tien, out of 6,000 present. So much for the disloy- 
dty and lack of bravery of an ofiicer who had won 
nost honorable mention in the Army of the Potomac, 
or skill and gallantry ; who had borne the brunt of 
he attack at Malvern Hill, and received for his ser- 
dces the commissions of Brevet Brigadier-General in 
he regular army, and Major-General of volunteers ; 
vho was brevetted as Captain and Major for services 
n the Mexican war, and was wounded in the assault 
)n the City of Mexico. 

The truth is. Pope was beaten by his own misman- 
gement. His ideas and the disposition of his forces 
vere (with one transient exception), so thoroughly 
:rroneous, and he showed such a capacity for refusing 
o accept correct information from persons or events, 
hat disaster was inevitable. "What he should not 
lave done he did with frightful energy, and what he 
hould have done he culpably neglected to do."* Lee 

* Gordon's " Army of Virginia," page 462. 



83 



himself was surprised. He expected nothing from 
Jackson's movement, but a formidable raid to save 
Gordonsville, and he "moved from victory to victory,' 
until he seriously menaced the Capital, and began an 
invasion of the North.""' 

It was not through any fault of officers or soldiers 
that Pope was beaten. Officers served him as well as 
they could, whatever they thought of him ; and — 

" Tho' the soldier knew 
Some one had blunder'd," 

he did not fail or falter in bravery or fidelity. The 
toilsome marches by day and night, the privations 
endured^ — for the army w^as in a condition little short 
of actual starvation — and above all, as Porter said 
the " killed and wounded and enfeebled troops attest 
their devotion to duty." 

One needs to consider only the methods of the 
commander as applied to the existing conditions, his 
faculty of painting everything (even his reports) with 
the colors of the imagination, to find ample explanation 
of his failure. Porter, who deserved as well of the 
Republic as did any officer in the army, has been for 
twenty years the chief sufferer for Pope's misstatements 
and mistakes. It now remains for the people, through 
their representatives in Congress, to right the grievous 
wrong inflicted upon one who, in two wars, served his 
country faithfully and gallantly. 

As the case stands to-day, Porter is fully vindicated 
by the highest military authorities of this and other 
nations ; by the most eminent statesmen and jurists in 

* Gordon's "Army of Virginia," page 463. 



84 



he land ; and by all intelligent and fair-minded men 
vho know the facts. He can afford to remain, like 
Belisarius, in silence and in poverty, intrusting to 
history his bright achievements and unsullied fame. 

But the Government cannot safely leave its repute 
o History, if, after having before it ov^ervvhelming 
;vidence of the terrible wrong inflicted upon a faithful 
;ervant, it delays for one unnecessary hour, the inad- 
equate reparation which can yet be made. 



THE END. 



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